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Health Theft
JASON R. BENT
Three possible approaches have been advanced for setting appropriate
occupational health standards: the feasibility principle currently employed
by OSHA, cost-benefit analysis, and a "soft" cost-benefit analysis that
allows for qualitative considerations. This Article rejects all three and
advances a fourth possible approach that would focus on counteracting
"health theft" by employers--employer actions that expose workers to
health risks without compensation. An anti-health theft approach
recognizes that Congress's purpose in enacting the Occupational Safety
and Health Act was to maximize worker welfare, not to maximize overall
total social welfare. This Article makes both the positive claim that
counteracting health theft was Congress's intent when it enacted the OSH
Act and the normative claim that an anti-health theft approach sets a
rational regulatory standard justified on distributional grounds. The
Article urges OSHA to adopt the anti-health theft principle as a reasonable
interpretation of the ambiguous Section 6(b) (5) of the OSH Act.
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Health Theft
JASON R. BENT*
I. INTRODUCTION
The term "wage theft" describes employer practices that deprive
workers of full payment of wages or benefits to which they are entitled
under federal or state law.i Wage theft is a well-understood way for
employers to capture some of the gains from trade in the labor market at
the expense of workers, and it has been extensively chronicled in recent
academic literature.2 But wage theft is not the only way that employers can
extract some of the workers' rightful gains from trade in the labor market.
Employers may also engage in "health theft" when they impose upon
workers health risks for which the workers receive no compensation, either
in the form of wage differentials or as compensatory payments for
resulting illnesses. The prospect-and the reality-of health theft were
apparent to Congress when it enacted the Occupational Safety and Health
* Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law; J.D., University of Michigan
Law School (2000); B.A., Grinnell College (1997). This Article benefited significantly from
discussions with participants at the Eighth Annual Employment and Labor Law Colloquium, held at the
University of Nevada-Las Vegas William S. Boyd School of Law, and insightful comments received
from Charlotte Alexander, Martha McCluskey, and Louis Virelli Ill. Special thanks to Ramsi
Woodcock and Mark Bauer for inspiring and contributing to the Article's consideration of a
longstanding debate in antitrust scholarship. This project was supported by a research grant from the
Stetson University College of Law. Allison Stevenson and Viktoryia Johnson provided outstanding
research assistance. Any remaining errors are my own.
1 See, e.g., Kim BOBo, WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA 7 (2009) ("Wage theft is when an employer
violates the law and deprives a worker of legally mandated wages."); Nantiya Ruan, What's Left to
Remedy Wage Theft? How Arbitration Mandates That Bar Class Actions Impact Low-Wage Workers,
2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1103, 1106 ("'Wage theft' has become the twenty-first century moniker for a
variety of wage and hour violations faced by low-wage workers in today's workplace.").
2 For examples of academic coverage, see, e.g., Matthew W. Finkin, From Weight Checking to
Wage Checking: Arming Workers to Combat Wage Theft, 90 IND. L.J. 851, 851-55 (2015) (describing
the industries and workers most affected by wage theft); Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability
for Wage Theft, 31 BERK. J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3-4 (2010) (reviewing the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 and the judicial interpretations of the Act in relation to wage theft); Nantiya Ruan, Facilitating
Wage Theft: How Courts Use Procedural Rules to Undermine Substantive Rights of Low-Wage
Workers, 63 VAND. L. REV. 727, 728-38 (2010) (providing a history of collective action lawsuits for
wage theft and pointing out some of the problems that claimants currently face). Dr. David Weil, the
Administrator for the Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division, attributes the growing problem
of wage theft to competitive pressures facing employers as a result of rising reliance on subcontractors,
franchise operators, and temporary workers. Steven Greenhouse, More Workers Are Claiming "Wage
Theft, " N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/0 I/business/more-workers-are-
claiming-wage-theft.html? r-0 [http://web.archive.org/web/20141003112852/http://www.nytimes.com
/2014/09/01/business/more-workers-are-claiming-wage-theft.html?_r-l].
Act (OSH Act) in 1970,3 which requires the Secretary of Labor to set
national occupational health standards. This Article contends that the
concept of health theft holds the key to understanding the goal of the OSH
Act and thereby deciphering the OSH Act's notoriously ambiguous
directive for setting occupational health standards.
The OSH Act's ambiguous Section 6(b)(5), once characterized by
Justice Rehnquist as a "legislative mirage,"' inspired an ongoing debate
about how best to set occupational health standards. That debate runs as
follows:
(1) Scholars resistant to formal cost-benefit analysis (CBA)
defend the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's
(OSHA) current approach, known as "feasibility analysis."
These scholars emphasize key shortcomings of CBA,
including the difficulty of placing a monetary value on
human life and the need for dubious extrapolations when
performing quantitative risk assessment.6
(2) Law and economics scholars argue that all occupational
health standards ought to pass a formal CBA, like most other
regulations. CBA proponents reject OSHA's feasibility
approach as incapable of principled application.'
(3) Others, most notably former Administrator of the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) Cass
Sunstein, favor a compromise approach, sometimes dubbed
Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (2012)).
4 29 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2012) (requiring employers to comply with standards); id. § 655(bX5)
(directing the Secretary of Labor regarding the promulgation of "standards dealing with toxic materials
or harmful physical agents"). The Secretary created the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) to administer the Act, and has delegated to the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety
and Health the authority to promulgate health standards under the Act. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.4 (1980); 36
Fed. Reg. 8754 (1971); see also Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan (Cotton Dust), 452 U.S. 490, 494
n.l (1981) ("The Secretary of Labor has delegated the authority to promulgate occupational safety and
health standards to the Assistant Secretary").
5 Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. at 546 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Indus. Union Dept. v. Am.
Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607, 681 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)).
6 See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety
Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENvTL.
AFF. L. REv. 1, 1 (2005) [hereinafter Driesen, Feasibility] (identifying difficulties in CBA
quantification of the benefits of regulation and defending the feasibility principle as a reasonable
alternative to CBA); David M. Driesen, Two Cheers for Feasible Regulation: A Modest Response to
Masur and Posner, 35 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 313, 341 (2011) [hereinafter Driesen, Two Cheers]
(concluding that the "feasibility principle has a good, albeit imperfect, normative justification and a
very good institutional justification").
' This view is exemplified by Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis,
77 U. CHI. L. REv. 657, 662 (2010) (asserting that feasibility analysis "lacks a normative justification
and should have no place in government regulation").
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"CBA Lite"' or "soft CBA."' This approach would ask
whether the benefits of regulation justify the costs, even if
they do not exceed the costs in absolute terms. Qualitative
considerations might justify regulation even where a strict
quantitative CBA calculation would not.io
This debate is unnecessarily circumscribed. A fourth approach would
satisfy CBA proponents' insistence on a principled decision rule, yet also
accomplish the purposes of the OSH Act more effectively than CBA, CBA
Lite, or even the feasibility test currently used by OSHA. This fourth
approach is to set occupational health standards at the level that best
counteracts health theft by employers." Health theft, as that term is used in
this Article, refers to the direct economic benefit that employers receive, at
the expense of a group of workers, as a result of exposing those workers to
health risks for which the workers receive no compensation in exchange.12
To be clear, health theft is a distributional concern, not strictly an
efficiency concern. Nonetheless, the primary claim of this Article is that
health theft was a chief focus of the legislative body that passed the OSH
Act in 1970, and that an anti-health theft decision rule can provide a
normatively sound guiding principle for prioritizing and administering
8 See Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein's Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics for Liberals, 29 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 191, 200 (2004) ("Professor Sunstein has designed the brand of cost-benefit analysis he is
selling to be as palatable as possible to liberals. It's Cost-Benefit Lite, Compassionate Cost-Benefit
Analysis, and Professor Sunstein cheerfully assures us it is 'for everyone."').
' Driesen, Feasibility, supra note 6, at 59; John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative
Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 433-34 (2008); Thomas 0. McGarity, Professor
Sunstein 's Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO. L.J. 2341, 2341 (2002).
0 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY
PROTECTION (2002); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
112 (2002) [hereinafter SuNsTEIN, RISK AND REASON] (stating that if the benefits of a regulatory
decision do not justify the regulation's costs, the agency should be given the chance to explain itself
and why the regulation is reasonable); Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 CALIF. L.
REV. 1369, 1404 (2014) (advocating for the use of a "breakeven analysis" of the costs and benefits of
regulations when unquantifiable values are present); Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90
GEo. L.J. 2255, 2257 (2002) (proposing a "benefits range" approach to EPA regulations that would
show who shoulders the benefits and burdens of a given regulation); Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit
Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1710 (2001) (stating that agencies should look into who
wins and who loses because of a regulation when costs exceed benefits); see also Graham, supra note
9, at 433-34 (comparing the "hard test" and the "soft test" for CBA).
" The term "health theft" is meant to capture a fundamental problem recognized by Congress
when it enacted the OSH Act: that employers often directly benefit economically, at the expense of
their employees, by providing lower levels of health protection to employees, and that this is especially
true "where there is a long period between exposure to a hazard and manifestation of an illness." S.
REP. NO. 91-1282, at 4 (1970).
2 Such compensation could take the form of increased wages, increased employment hours,
better benefits, additional job security, or other improved conditions of employment.
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occupational health standards. 13
In more formal economic terms, the anti-health theft principle would
require that OSHA standards be set at levels that maximize worker welfare
(alternatively called worker surplus), regardless of whether the overall
social costs of a standard exceed its overall social benefits. A regulatory
standard focused exclusively on worker welfare would ensure that an
OSHA health standard maximizes the net benefits to workers as a group-
taking into account the risk of injuries or illnesses as well as the standard's
anticipated effects on employee wages, benefits, and employment levels-
regardless of a standard's overall efficiency from a CBA perspective.
This Article rejects all three of the proposed approaches to OSHA
health standards advanced in the literature to date, in favor of an anti-
health theft approach. The Article contends, as a descriptive matter, that
the maximization of worker welfare to counteract health theft was
precisely what Congress intended when enacting the OSH Act, and that it
is the most sensible interpretation of the ambiguous language found in the
OSH Act. The Article further contends, as a normative matter, that the
anti-health theft principle is justified and should guide the promulgation of
occupational health standards. As a policy prescription, this Article urges
OSHA to expressly abandon its vague and inconsistent interpretation of
feasibility analysis, and to adopt instead an understanding of feasibility that
focuses on the maximization of worker welfare. This new approach to
feasibility would offer a reasonable agency interpretation of the OSH Act's
directive, to which reviewing courts would be required to give deference
under Chevron v. NRDC.14
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II lays out the relevant statutory
text and judicial attempts to interpret it, as well as a description of OSHA's
current understanding of the feasibility test. Part II also substantially
expands on the current literature by providing the first comprehensive
review of OSHA's use of feasibility analysis in major health standards
since the Supreme Court's Cotton Dust case. Part II then frames the
running academic challenge to OSHA's feasibility standard advanced by
proponents of CBA and CBA Lite. Part IV sets out the details of the
" This Article is addressed exclusively to the regulation of occupational health. Much of the
literature debating the relative virtues of CBA considers environmental regulation as well as
occupational safety and health. See supra notes 6-10 and text accompanying. Several factors relevant
to the analysis in this Article, however, counsel in favor of a narrower claim regarding only
occupational health regulations. First, in the occupational setting there exists a privity of contract
between employees and employers that is absent in the context of environmental health risks. Second,
differences between the statutory text and legislative history of the OSH Act and various federal
environmental statutes suggest at least the possibility that potentially differing Congressional purposes
underlie the respective federal statutes. For these reasons, the positive and normative claims set forth
below are limited to occupational health regulation.
14 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) (holding that if Congress is silent on a precise regulatory
question, courts must look at whether an agency's interpretation of the statute at issue is permissible).
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overlooked fourth approach to health standards: the anti-health theft
principle. In doing so, Part IV draws upon the literature from a seemingly
unrelated field of law-antitrust law, where a similar distributional
principle has been widely influential. Part V makes the positive claim that
the anti-health theft principle is consistent with the statutory text and well-
supported by the legislative history of the OSH Act. Finally, Part VI makes
the normative claim that OSHA ought to replace its current feasibility test,
which has suffered from inconsistent application across specific
occupational standards (as will be shown herein), with an interpretation of
feasibility founded upon the anti-health theft principle. Part VI further
demonstrates that an anti-health theft interpretation of feasibility analysis
would satisfy CBA proponents' insistence upon a clear, principled decision
rule and would command the deference of reviewing courts.
II. FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS: A LEGISLATIVE MIRAGE?
"[The majority's] view is that Congress required the
Secretary to engage in something called feasibility
analysis.'. . . But those words mean nothing at all. They are
a 'legislative mirage, appearing to some Members [of
Congress] but not to others, and assuming any form desired
by the beholder.'15
A. The Statutory Text
Justice Rehnquist's view that "feasibility analysis" under the OSH Act
is a meaningless legislative mirage did not command a majority of the
Court. 16 Nonetheless, his underlying concern about the vagueness of the
OSH Act's statutory directive to the Secretary of Labor is well-taken. To
understand his concern, and to understand the development of OSHA's
current feasibility test, a brief review of the OSH Act's text and the key
precedent interpreting that text is required.
The OSH Act, enacted in 1970, permits the Secretary of Labor to
establish permanent health and safety standards for the protection of
" Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan (Cotton Dust), 452 U.S. 490, 546 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Indus. Union Dept. v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S.
607, 681 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)).
6 In the 1980 Benzene case, Justice Rehnquist wrote only for himself Benzene, 448 U.S. at 671
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). In the 1981 Cotton Dust case, Justice Rehnquist had convinced Chief
Justice Burger to join his view that the OSH Act's "legislative mirage" rendered it an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority. Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. at 543 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Questions
about the constitutionality of the OSH Act under the non-delegation doctrine have also been raised
more recently by Cass Sunstein. See Cass R. Sunstein, Is OSHA Unconstitutional?, 94 VA. L. REV.
1407, 1447-48 (2008) (raising invalidation of the OSH Act on constitutional grounds as an aggressive,
but plausible, course for courts to take following the Supreme Court's decision in Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001)).
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workers,1 7  and requires that covered employers comply with such
standards.' 8 But the Act is remarkably vague about the type of analysis that
is required (or permitted) of the Secretary in setting such permanent
standards.' 9 There are only two textual provisions of the Act that can be
viewed as constraining or guiding the Secretary's promulgation of
permanent standards. The primary one, Section 3(8) of the Act, is actually
not a substantive directive to the Secretary,20 but is rather the Act's
definition of "occupational safety and health standard":
The term "occupational safety and health standard" means a
standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of
one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or
processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide
safe or healthful employment and places of employment.21
Although no doubt open to widely varying interpretations, the italicized
language in the definition above has been viewed as potentially
constraining the Secretary's authority to promulgate permanent
standards.2 2
The second textual provision of the Act that constrains the Secretary,
Section 6(b)(5) of the Act, applies only to that subset of permanent
standards "dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical agents" and
provides, in relevant part:
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic
materials or harmful physical agents under this subsection,
shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the
extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence,
that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or
functional capacity even if such employee has regular
exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the
17 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (2012) (setting out the procedure by which the Secretary "may by rule
promulgate, modify, or revoke any occupational safety or health standard").
I Id. § 654(aX2).
' See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 1407-08 (noting the breadth of the statutory directive to the
Secretary in the OSH Act, analogizing it to a hypothetical directive to "do what you believe is best. Act
reasonably and appropriately. Adopt the legal standard that your prefer, all things considered").
20 See id. at 1408 ("Notably, this language appears in a mere definitional clause, not in a separate
substantive provision instructing the Secretary what, exactly, he is supposed to consider in deciding
what to do.").
21 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 3(8), 84 Stat. 1590, 1591
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (2012)) (emphasis added).
22 E.g., Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan (Cotton Dust), 452 U.S. 490, 512-13 n.32 (1981)
(noting that the language "reasonably necessary or appropriate" in Section 3(8) of the Act might require
some balancing of costs and benefits in cases not involving toxic substances); Sunstein, supra note 16,
at 1417 (raising the question how the Secretary should be constrained in cases not involving toxic
substances).
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period of his working life.... In addition to the attainment of
the highest degree of health and safety protection for the
employee, other considerations shall be the latest available
scientific data in the field, the feasibility of the standards, and
experience gained under this and other health and safety
laws. 23
Section 6(b)(5) of the Act, with its multiple layers of qualifications and its
use of the phrases "to the extent feasible" and "feasibility of the
standards," provides the textual footing for the type of feasibility analysis
that Justice Rehnquist would later deride as a mere legislative mirage.
B. Benzene and Cotton Dust
The question whether Section 3(8) and/or Section 6(b)(5) of the OSH
Act require the Secretary to weigh the expected costs imposed by a
standard against its expected benefits was first presented to the Supreme
Court ten years after passage of the Act, in the 1980 Benzene case.2 4 OSHA
had promulgated a new, more restrictive standard for employee exposures
to the substance benzene.25 The Court, however, avoided the difficult
question about cost-benefit analysis by rejecting OSHA's new benzene
exposure standard on other grounds. A plurality of the justices found that
OSHA had not met its initial burden of showing that the new benzene
standard would reduce or eliminate a significant risk of harm to workers.26
Writing separately in Benzene, Justice Rehnquist first articulated his view
that Congress had unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to
OSHA by not resolving the question whether or how costs were to be taken
into account in setting standards.27
' Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 6(b)(5) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 655(b)(5) (2012)) (emphasis added).
24 Indus. Union Dept. v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1980).
' Id at 613. OSHA had promulgated a standard reducing the airborne permissible exposure limit
(PEL) for benzene from 10 parts per million (ppm) to I ppm. See id. at 614 n.5.
26 See id at 639-40 ("In our view, it is not necessary to decide whether either the Government or
industry is entirely correct [about whether cost-benefit analysis is required].. . . Because the Secretary
did not make the required threshold finding [of a significant risk of harm under the existing PEL] in
these cases, we have no occasion to determine whether costs must be weighed against benefits in an
appropriate case."). Only Justice Powell would have reached the cost-benefit question and required
some form of cost-benefit analysis, concluding "that the statute also requires the agency to determine
that the economic effects of its standard bear a reasonable relationship to the expected benefits. An
occupational health standard is neither 'reasonably necessary' nor 'feasible,' as required by the statute,
if it calls for expenditures wholly disproportionate to the expected health and safety benefits." Id. at
667 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
27 See id. at 687 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment) ("It is difficult to imagine a more obvious
example of Congress simply avoiding a choice which was both fundamental for purposes of the statute
and yet politically so divisive that the necessary decision or compromise was difficult, if not
impossible, to hammer out in the legislative forge.").
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The question of costs and benefits proved unavoidable in the next
term's Cotton Dust case. There, OSHA had promulgated a standard
tightening the PEL for cotton dust across a number of different processes
within the cotton industry. 28 Industry representatives argued that Sections
3(8) and 6(b)(5), when read together, required "OSHA to demonstrate that
its Standard reflects a reasonable relationship between the costs and
benefits associated with the Standard." 29 This time, a majority of the Court
reached the cost-benefit issue and rejected the industry's position. The
majority opinion, authored by Justice Brennan, held:
In effect then, . . . Congress itself defined the basic
relationship between costs and benefits, by placing the
"benefit" of worker health above all other considerations
save those making attainment of this "benefit"
unachievable.. . . Thus, cost-benefit analysis by OSIIA is not
required by the statute because feasibility analysis is.30
The feasibility analysis that OSHA had conducted, and that the Court
appeared to endorse," involved two distinct components: technological
feasibility and economic feasibility. 3 2  The meaning of technological
feasibility was not squarely at issue in Cotton Dust,33 and has not been
definitively articulated by the Supreme Court. One Court of Appeals put
the inquiry this way: "To show that a standard is technologically feasible,
OSHA must demonstrate 'that modem technology has at least conceived
2 The existing standard, an "established Federal standard" that had been adopted as an interim
standard shortly after passage of the Act pursuant to Section 6(a) of the Act, included a PEL of 1,000
micrograms per cubic meter (ug/m'). See Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan (Cotton Dust), 452 U.S.
490, 499 (1981). OSHA had promulgated a new, more restrictive cotton dust standard that included a
PEL of 200 ug/m' for yam manufacturing processes, 750 ug/m' for slashing and weaving, and 500
ug/m' for all other cotton processes. See id at 501-02.
29 Id. at 494.
'
0 Id. at 509.
" Importantly, the Cotton Dust case was decided three years prior to the Court's landmark
administrative law decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Thus, the Court did
not employ Chevron's two-step inquiry in reviewing OSHA's interpretation of the OSH Act.
32 Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. at 495 ("They interpret the Act as mandating that OSHA enact the most
protective standard possible to eliminate a significant risk of material health impairment, subject to the
constraints of economic and technological feasibility."). In finding that the legislative history supported
the Secretary's interpretation of the statute, the majority wrote: "Congress was concerned that the Act
might be thought to require achievement of absolute safety, an impossible standard, and therefore
insisted that health and safety goals be capable of economic and technological accomplishment." Id. at
514. Justice Rehnquist also interpreted the majority decision as "adopt[ing] the Secretary's view that
feasibility means 'technological and economic feasibility."' Id. at 546 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The
separate components of technological and economic feasibility are considered in detail in the following
subpart.
" See id at 529 n.53 ("We also note that, although petitioners challenged the technological
feasibility of the final Cotton Dust Standard in the Court of Appeals, they have abandoned such
challenge here.").
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some industrial strategies or devices which are likely to be capable of
meeting the PEL and which the industries are generally capable of
adopting."' 34 The economic feasibility standard used by OSHA, and tacitly
endorsed by the Court, in Cotton Dust generally asks whether compliance
with a proposed standard would threaten "the long-term profitability and
competitiveness of an industry." Precisely how OSHA has applied this
standard in practice is discussed in the following subpart.
Justice Rehnquist, of course, believed that this supposed "feasibility
analysis" was nothing more than a meaningless concept, drawn from
ambiguous words chosen by Congress to avoid resolving the "hard policy
choices" that were really at issue, including whether OSHA should be (a)
required to, (b) permitted to, or (c) prohibited from, weighing the expected
costs of a new permanent health standard against the expected benefits of
that standard.36 Justice Rehnquist, therefore, would have invalidated the
statute as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.37
Despite the protests of Justice Rehnquist, this time joined by Chief
Justice Burger, it was Justice Brennan's interpretation of Section 6(b)(5)
and "feasibility analysis" that prevailed in Cotton Dust, and that has guided
OSHA in its promulgation of health standards ever since. Cotton Dust
remains the leading precedent on how the costs imposed by an
occupational health standard should be taken into account, if at all, by
OSHA when setting permanent standards. The next subpart examines
OSHA's inconsistency in applying the feasibility analysis endorsed in
Cotton Dust.
C. OSHA's Economic Feasibility Test in Practice
The literature debating the respective virtues of feasibility analysis and
cost-benefit analysis contains samplings of OSHA's treatment of economic
feasibility3 in practice. For example, Professors Masur and Posner in
3 AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 980 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). The precise meaning of technological feasibility has
been the subject of some disagreement in the lower courts. See Howard A. Latin, The Feasibility of
Occupational Health Standards: An Essay on Legal Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty, 78 Nw. U. L.
REv. 583, 595 (1983) ("The Courts of Appeals have disagreed about the extent to which OSHA can
impose a strict PEL predicated on the future development of innovative control methods.").
3 See Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. at 530-31 n.55. The Court appeared to leave open the possibility that
an even more forgiving test of economic feasibility (from a regulator's perspective) could be applied by
OSHA, stating, "[T]hese cases do not present, and we do not decide, the question whether a standard
that threatens the long-term profitability and competitiveness of an industry is 'feasible' within the
meaning of § 6(bX5) of the Act." Id.
* Id. at 543-44 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
* Id at 548.
3 For present purposes, economic feasibility is the more relevant of the two components of
feasibility analysis, as it is directed to some consideration of whether the costs of compliance cause the
standard to fail the statutory feasibility requirement.
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Against Feasibility Analysis, use a case study to meticulously examine the
economic feasibility analysis performed by OSHA in its 2006
promulgation of the Hexavalent Chromium Standard. 3 9 But the literature
does not yet include a more comprehensive examination of how OSHA has
implemented economic feasibility across many different health standards.
This subpart fills that void in the literature by taking a wider look at
OSHA's economic feasibility test, as actually applied by OSHA across
thirteen different major substance-specific health standards that OSHA has
successfully promulgated since the Cotton Dust case was decided in
1981.40 This overview reveals a striking inconsistency in OSH4A's own
tests for economic feasibility; an inconsistency that ultimately lends
credibility to CBA proponents' claim that OSHA's current feasibility
analysis lacks a principled foundation.
Since the OSH Act became effective in 1971, OSHA has successfully
promulgated or revised only approximately thirty major permanent health
standards.4 1 Only twenty of those standards were promulgated or revised
after the 1981 Cotton Dust case.42 The table below briefly summarizes how
OSHA applied the concept of economic feasibility in promulgating thirteen
of those standards that dealt with exposures to specific substances or
toxins, including bloodbome pathogens.
Standard Year Economic Feasibility Analysis Summary
Ethylene 1984 Economic feasibility not specifically defined,
Oxide and no specific thresholds identified.
Compliance cost analysis determined that for
ethylene oxide producers and ethoxylator
sectors, compliance costs were approximately
0.2% and 0.1% of total annual sales. OSHA
" See Masur & Posner, supra note 7, at 670-80 (outlining the authors' examination of the OSH1A
economic feasibility analysis).
' The health standards reviewed herein are hazard- or substance-specific standards. Accordingly,
this review does not include OSHA's Hazard Communication Standard, Field Sanitation Standard,
Access to Medical Records Standard, Chemical Exposures in Laboratories Standard, Hearing
Conservation, or Respiratory Protection Standard. Nor does this review include OSHA's
comprehensive update to the PELs for 428 different airborne contaminants, which was vacated by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11th Cir. 1992).
For a list of major health standards promulgated by OSHA since the Act's passage through 2000, see
NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO OSHA's STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT PROCESS app. F (2000), https:/
/www.osha.gov/dop/nacosh/nreport.html#CHRONOLOGY [https://perma.cc/E4SS-RFJZ] [hereinafter
NACOSH].
41 NACOSH, supra note 40; David Michaels, Assistant Sec'y of Labor, Remarks Regarding
Request for Information on Updating OSHA's Chemical Permissible Exposure Limits (Oct. 9, 2014),
https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show-document?ptable=SPEECHES&pid3313 [https:/
/perma.cc/MC56-EHM4].
42 NACOSH, supra note 40.
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Cotton Dust
(revision)
Formaldehyde 1987 Determined based on data showing that most
industry sectors were operating at proposed
PEL already; therefore, changes in cost to
profit ratio were minimal and could be passed
on to consumers where necessary. Annual
compliance costs were less than 0.5% of
4 Occupational Exposure to Ethylene Oxide, 49 Fed. Reg. 25,734, 25,767-68 (June 22, 1984).
"Occupational Exposure to Cotton Dust, 50 Fed. Reg. 51,120, 51,166-67 (Dec. 13, 1985).
45 Id at 51,169-71.
" Id. at 51,170.
7 Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 52 Fed. Reg. 34,460, 34,517-18 (Sept. 11, 1987).
1985
Benzene
concluded that compliance would not have
significant impact on the market structure of
any industries.4 3
For textile industries, economic feasibility
was demonstrated by data from 1978
standard, and revised standard made
compliance even more cost effective.
Economic feasibility was not challenged, and
compliance had largely been already
achieved.44 For non-textile industries,
including waste recycling and garnetting,
upper-bound estimates of 10.4% of total
revenues and 1% of total revenues,
respectively, were not economically
infeasible. OSHA also noted ability of these
two sectors to pass through some costs. 4 5
Even at higher cost estimates, no garnetting
operations were predicted to close, although
some might process synthetic rather than
cotton wastes.46
No specific thresholds identified. OSHA
found that compliance costs, if fully absorbed
by firms, would result in average 2% profit
decline in affected product lines, except in
iron and steel sectors, including coke and coal
chemical. OSHA noted that the domestic steel
industry was facing a financial crisis. For
these sectors, OSHA permitted a longer five-
year (as opposed to two-year) phase-in period
for compliance. Given longer phase-in period,
compliance was economically feasible for
these sectors.47
1987
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revenues for all sectors except fiberboard, at
1.65% of revenues. For a few wood product
sectors, costs might exceed 3% of profits, but
declining value of U.S. dollar would permit
pass through of costs to consumers.48
Bloodborne 1991 No specific thresholds identified. Found that
Pathogens the average costs totaled less than 1% of
revenue and 7% of profits for most sectors,
with a maximum of 8.4% of profits for one
sector. OSHA also provided evidence of
strong demand for health care services,
allowing firms to more readily absorb
compliance costs. Standard was therefore
economically feasible.49
4,4 1992 No specific thresholds identified. For general
Methylenda- industry, predicted total annualized
dianiline compliance costs of $10 million can be passed
(MDA) through to consumers; price increases will not
be large; cost not large compared to net
income; therefore, economically feasible.so
For construction industry, firms would face
annualized costs of approximately $5450
each, which could readily be passed through
with extremely small price increases or
absorbed by the firms.5 '
Cadmium 1992 Specific threshold of compliance costs
identified at 20% of profits. Where proposed
PEL engineering compliance cost met or
exceeded 20% of industry profits, a less costly
separate engineering control air limit
(SECAL) was considered.52
48 Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde, 52 Fed. Reg. 46,168, 46,238 (Dec. 4, 1987).
49 Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,004, 64,079-80 (Dec. 6,
1991).
I Occupational Exposure to 4,4' Methylendadianiline (MDA), 57 Fed. Reg. 35,630, 35,642 (Aug.
10, 1992).
' Id at 35,644.
52 Occupational Exposure to Cadmium, 57 Fed. Reg. 42,102, 42,222 (Sep. 14, 1992) (including
varying PELs or SECALs for certain processes within different industries), as corrected by 58 Fed.
Reg. 21,778 (Apr. 23, 1993).
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Lead 1993 Formal economic feasibility analysis not
(construction) required, due to specific authorizing
legislation.5 3 In conducting regulatory impact
analysis, no specific threshold identified for
cost of compliance vs. annual payroll, sales,
or profits.54
Asbestos 1994 Latest Revision (1994): No specific thresholds
(multiple identified. Found that the average incremental
revisions) compliance costs total 0.6% of profits,
therefore economically feasible. Where
sectors had significant profit reductions,
including friction materials (26.2%) and
gaskets and packing (7.3%), they could be
made up by passing cost to consumers.
1,3 Butadiene 1996 No specific thresholds identified. Found that
the decrease in revenue is less than 0.5% and
the profit loss is less than 4% in all industries,
therefore economically feasible.5 6
Methylene 1997 No specific thresholds identified. Compliance
Chloride costs would average 0.18% of industry sales
and 3.79% of industry profits, therefore
economically feasible.
Hexavalent 2006 Specific threshold providing that cost of
Chromium compliance should be less than 1% of revenue
and less than 10% of profit to be considered
economically feasible. Several industry-
specific exceptions to threshold permitted. 8
53 The Interim Final Rule for Lead Exposure in Construction was the result of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3924, which specifically
directed the Secretary of Labor to issue an interim final rule for lead exposures in construction. The
construction industry had been exempted from OSHA's 1978 revision of the Lead Standard for General
Industry from 200 ug/m' to 50 ug/m3 . OSHA Interim Final Rule, Lead Exposure in Construction, 58
Fed. Reg. 26,590, 26,590-91 (May 4, 1993). Because the interim final rule was issued pursuant to the
authority of the Housing and Community Development Act, rather than the OSH Act, OSHA was "not
required to comply with any of the requirements of the OSH Act for 6(b) rulemakings." Id at 26,592.
Thus, OSHA was not required to "provide a formal analysis of economic and technological feasibility."
Id.
* OSHA Interim Final Rule, Lead Exposure in Construction, 58 Fed. Reg. at 26,592.
* Occupational Exposure to Asbestos, 59 Fed. Reg. 40,964, 41,050 (Aug. 10, 1994), as corrected
by 61 Fed. Reg. 43,454 (Aug. 23, 1996).
' Occupational Exposure to 1,3 Butadiene, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,746, 56,796 (Nov. 4, 1996).
s7 Occupational Exposure to Methylene Chloride, 62 Fed. Reg. 1494, 1567 (Jan. 10, 1997).
" Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. 10,100, 10,299-10,300 (Feb.
28, 2006) ("And while there is no hard and fast rule, in the absence of evidence to the contrary OSHA
generally considers a standard economically feasible when the costs of compliance are less than one
percent of revenues.").
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Respirable 2016 Specific threshold providing that cost of
Crystalline compliance should be less than 1% of revenue
Silica and less than 10% of profit to be considered
(Silica Dust) economically feasible. OSHA identified eight
industries in the General Industry and
Maritime groups where costs exceed 10% of
profit. OSHA noted that these industries "do
not appear to be perfectly elastic or close to
it," and that they would "generally be able to
pass on most or all of the costs of the final
rule" through price increases rather than
suffering decreased profits.59
As is readily apparent from the table above, OSHA has been
inconsistent in its implementation of an economic feasibility analysis. For
some standards, such as the Cadmium Standard and the most recent
Hexavalent Chromium and Silica Dust Standards, the agency declares a
threshold or a decision rule based on compliance costs calculated as a
percentage of annualized revenues, profits, or both. In other cases, OSHA
does not indicate any such threshold, and simply determines that a certain
compliance cost level is economically feasible for a given industry or
sector, sometimes after comparing costs to that industry's revenue or profit
level. And even on the few occasions that OSHA has clearly articulated a
threshold for economic feasibility, those thresholds have varied
significantly! While 20% of profits were thought to be a critical cutoff for
the Cadmium Standard, the thresholds for the more recent Hexavalent
Chromium and Silica Dust Standards were set at 1% of revenue and 10%
of profits.
This type of inconsistency is compounded by a number of ad hoc
exceptions that OSHA sometimes determines to be appropriate for given
industries or given applications of a substance. For example, in reducing
the PEL for methylene chloride from 500 parts per million (ppm) to 25
ppm, OSHA estimated, based on several studies, that compliance costs
would average 0.18% of industry sales and 3.79% of industry profits.60 But
for three particular applications, compliance costs as a percentage of
profits were significantly higher, including one that was an order of
magnitude higher-furniture stripping, at 39.4% of profits.61 OSHA
concluded that those few sectors would easily be able to pass the
" Occupational Exposure to Respirable Crystalline Silica, 81 Fed. Reg. 16,286, 16,535, 16,545
(Mar. 25, 2016).
' Occupational Exposure to Methylene Chloride, 62 Fed. Reg. at 1567.
61 Id The other two applications were flexible polyurethane foam manufacturing (9.23%) and
construction (9.67%). Id.
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compliance costs through to consumers with a 2.1% or less increase in
purchase prices.62 Further, OSHA found that many furniture-stripping
applications were in market niches unlikely to be sensitive to such minor
increases in purchase prices.63
A similar ad hoc approach was taken when OSHA issued a standard in
1994 reducing the PEL for asbestos from 0.2 fibers per cubic centimeter
(f/cc) to 0.1 f/cc. 6 4 OSHA estimated that the incremental increase in
compliance costs as a percentage of profits were moderate across affected
industries, except for two industry sectors: friction materials and gaskets
and packing.6 5 In those two sectors, OSHA estimated that compliance costs
would be 26.2% and 7.3%, respectively.66 Nonetheless, OSHA found
economic feasibility even as to these two sectors, reasoning that they could
minimize the impact on profits by passing compliance costs through to
consumers, resulting in a product price increase of less than 2%.67 OSHA
determined that this modest price increase would not likely affect the
demand for the sector products.
Likewise, Professors Masur and Posner reviewed OSHA's feasibility
analysis for the Hexavalent Chromium Standard and detailed twelve
instances of industry-specific exceptions to the stated thresholds for
economic feasibility (1% of revenue and 10% of profits).69 OSHA
defended these departures primarily based on relatively weakly supported
claims of price inelasticity, even for industries where compliance costs as a
percentage of profits exceeded 20 or 30%.70 Similar observations about
price elasticity were used to justify the imposition of compliance costs
exceeding 10% of profits for certain industries in OSHA's recent Silica
Dust Standard.
62 id.
63 Id at 1568 ("Approximately half of all furniture refinishing sales derive from antique
refinishing, a market niche that is unlikely to be sensitive to a 2.0 percent change in price. Even in the
area of used furniture refinishing, which constitutes the remaining half of the furniture refinishing
market, a 2.0 percent price increase would be unlikely to significantly alter the amount of furniture
being refinished.").
' Occupational Exposure to Asbestos, 59 Fed. Reg. 40,964, 40,978. The Asbestos Standard had
already been revised a number of times since the first PEL for asbestos was promulgated in 1971, at a
level of 12 f/cc. Id. at 40,964.
65 Id at 41,050.
6 Id.
67 Id ("For reasons given below, OSHA believes that profit impacts will be minimized by the
ability of firms to pass forward costs to consumers. The small increases in product prices (less than 2
percent) necessary to cover the increased costs of production would be unlikely to affect the demand
for these products.").
6 id.
69 Masur & Posner, supra note 7, at 678-79.70 Id.
71 Occupational Exposure to Respirable Crystalline Silica, 81 Fed. Reg. 16,286, 16,545 (Mar. 25,
2016) (discussing predicted effects on demand of modest price increases in "brick and structural clay,
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OSHA's inconsistency on economic feasibility analysis and its ad hoc
approach to certain industries and applications lends credibility to the
primary critique of feasibility analysis-that it is ultimately unprincipled.
As Professors Masur and Posner put it, feasibility analysis as currently
understood and implemented by OSHA "offers no theoretical way to
determine the correct balance."72
IlI. CBA ALTERNATIVES TO FEASIBILITY
A. Full-Flavored CBA
In administrative law, the type of economic feasibility analysis
described above is the exception rather than the rule. Beginning with an
executive order issued by President Ronald Reagan in 1981, CBA has been
required for all major regulations to the extent permitted by law. 73 This
general approach favoring some version of CBA for most regulations has
been followed by subsequent presidential administrations, including
President Barack Obama's administration. 74  The promulgation of
occupational health standards under Section 6(b)(5) of the OSH Act,
however, has been interpreted to require feasibility analysis instead of
vitreous china, ceramic wall and floor tile, other structural clay products . . . and the various other
products manufactured by affected industries").
72 Id. at 706.
" Executive Order No. 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,194 (Feb. 17, 1981); see also Masur &
Posner, supra note 7, at 659 (stating that when a statutory scheme forbids an agency from considering
CBA, it still performs the analysis, merely disregarding the results in their decision-making). The 1981
Executive Order provides, in part:
In promulgating new regulations, reviewing existing regulations, and developing
legislative proposals concerning regulation, all agencies, to the extent permitted by
law, shall adhere to the following requirements: ... (b) Regulatory action shall not
be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the
potential costs to society; [and] (c) Regulatory objectives shall be chosen to
maximize the net benefits to society."
Executive Order No. 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,193. The Executive Order further provides that for all
"major" rules, defined as those having an annual effect of $100 million or more on the economy, id,
agencies must prepare a Regulatory Impact Analysis containing a description of the potential costs and
benefits of the rule, along with a determination of the rule's potential net benefits. Id. at 13194.
74 See Executive Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011) ("IT]o the extent
permitted by law, each agency must, among other things: (1) propose or adopt a regulation only upon a
reasoned determination that its benefits justify its costs (recognizing that some benefits and costs are
difficult to quantify) .... ). This 2011 Executive Order, and particularly its reference to benefits that
"justify" costs, reflects the influence of CBA Lite, as advocated by Cass Sunstein, who served as the
Administrator of OIRA from 2009 to 2012. Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs: Myths and Realities, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Summer 2013, at 8, 8; Memorandum from Cass
R. Sunstein, Adm'r, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies, & of Indep.
Regulatory Agencies 1 (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memo
randa/2011/mll-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/8V4V-VUXJ] (indicating that Executive Order No. 13563
permits consideration of values that are "difficult or impossible to quantify").
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CBA, given the text of Congress's statutory directive.15  As Justice
Brennan's majority opinion in Cotton Dust put it: "cost-benefit analysis by
OSHA is not required by the statute because feasibility analysis is."7 6 Most
courts and commentators have construed the majority opinion in Cotton
Dust to mean that CBA analysis is not permitted in setting Section 6(b)(5)
occupational health standards.77
Nonetheless, even after Cotton Dust, some CBA adherents have urged
OSHA to employ CBA on all occupational health and safety standards,
including Section 6(b)(5) health standards dealing with toxins.78 Formal
CBA would require that the quantified aggregate benefits of a proposed
" Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan (Cotton Dust), 452 U.S. 490, 509 (1981). Congress's
apparent rejection of formal CBA in statutory text also appears in several environmental statutes. The
Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7515 (2012), and the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§
1251-1388 (2012), are frequently cited examples of environmental statutes with Congressional
directives that require feasibility analysis. SUNSTEtN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 10 (arguing that
agencies should be required to show that the benefits justify the costs); Gregory Keating, Pricelessness
and Life: An Essay for Guido Calabresi, 64 MD. L. REV. 159, 187 (2005) (citing the CWA as an
example of a statute requiring economic feasibility analysis); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L.
Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based Environmental Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1184, 1193 (2014)
("Best available technology standards in the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act are prominent
examples of feasibility standards."); Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L.
REv. 1651, 1665 n.83 (2001) (citing Section 6(bX5) of the OSH Act and the CAA as examples of
statutory directives that have been interpreted as requiring feasibility analysis). A third approach,
"health-based" standards that are entirely cost blind, is even required for some forms of environmental
regulation, including in setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) under the CAA.
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2000) ("The text of § 109(b), interpreted in its
statutory and historical context and within appreciation for its importance to the CAA as a whole,
unambiguously bars cost considerations from the NAAQS-setting process, and thus ends the matter for
us as well as the EPA."); Livermore & Revesz, supra, at 1193-94 ("Health-based standards ... are the
third principal approach to determining the stringency of environmental regulation . . . . They differ
from feasibility standards because they are not constrained by what a particular industry could achieve
without going out of business."); Noah M. Sachs, Rescuing the Strong Precautionary Principle from Its
Critics, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1285, 1310 n.121 ("In 2001, the Supreme Court affirmed that the NAAQS
are health-based standards that EPA must establish without reliance on cost-benefit analysis.").
76 Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. at 509.
1 Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 557 F.3d 165, 177 (3d Cir. 2009)
("We note that the Supreme Court has conclusively ruled that economic feasibility does not involve a
cost-benefit analysis."); Am. Dental Ass'n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 825 (7th Cir. 1993) ("OSHA did
not (indeed is not authorized to) compare the benefits with the costs and impose the restrictions on
finding that the former exceeded the latter."); Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep't v. Brock, 838 F.2d 1258,
1264 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("In Cotton Dust the Court held that the 'feasibility' standard of §6(bX5) does
not require the Secretary to balance cost and benefit in defining a standard, and clearly manifested the
Court's belief that the Act did not permit the Secretary to do so"); Randy S. Rabinowitz & Mark M.
Hager, Designing Health and Safety: Workplace Hazard Regulation in the United States and Canada,
33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 373, 382 (2000) ("In deciding whether to regulate toxins, OSHA may not use
cost-benefit analysis, which generally yields less protection than would feasibility analysis. . . .
[R]ather, it must reduce significant risk so long as such reductions are economically and technically
feasible."). But see Masur & Posner, supra note 7, at 669-70 (contending that OSHA should be
permitted to use CBA instead of feasibility analysis as a proper exercise of Chevron discretion).
7' E.g., Masur & Posner, supra note 7, at 669-70.
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occupational health regulation exceed the quantified aggregate costs of
complying with that regulation. Professors Masur and Posner contend that
CBA is the only principled approach to setting Section 6(b)(5)
occupational health standards. 9 For Masur and Posner, CBA uniquely
offers a clear and coherent guiding principle-the maximization of total
social welfare-while feasibility is essentially rudderless.80
Masur and Posner make their case primarily by attacking feasibility
analysis as an unworthy alternative to CBA. They offer a range of critiques
of feasibility analysis, broadly summarized as follows:
(a) that feasibility analysis does not provide a coherent
stopping point for how far regulation should go;8 '
(b) that feasibility analysis overregulates because it ignores
the costs of regulations imposed on consumers. This permits
regulation at a level that would fail CBA because negative
effects on consumers outweigh benefits, but that would pass
feasibility because it would not lead to widespread plant
closures; 82
(c) that feasibility analysis overregulates by focusing on plant
closures, rather than total job loss, thereby ignoring
widespread increases in unemployment that do not cause
plant closures;83
(d) that feasibility analysis underregulates by prohibiting a
regulation that would substantially reduce a significant risk
of harm simply because it may close some plants, even
though the overall benefits may outweigh the costs;"
(e) that feasibility analysis provides no clarity, leaving
agencies to the use of arbitrary presumptions or rules, with ad
" Id at 706.
" Id. at 698-99, 706.
a See id. at 702 ("But [feasibility analysis] does not explain how far regulation should go: at what
point should we regard suppression of economic activity as too great to justify a regulation that reduces
risk?").
' See id. ("A regulation that reduces risks of harm very little, while imposing very high costs on
consumers, should not be issued even if it does not close any plants.").
8 See id at 703 ("And this is not even to mention the fact that regulations that do not cause
'widespread plant closings' could nonetheless lead to widespread layoffs-that is, layoffs from plants
that are not entirely shut down."); see also Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Regulation,
Unemployment, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 98 VA. L. REv. 579, 585 (2012) (noting that neither
bankruptcy rates nor widespread plant shutdowns "necessarily implicate[] unemployment-workers at
firms that close might be hired by the firms that remain open or be absorbed into other industries.").
" Masur & Posner, supra note 7, at 702
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hoc exceptions that are inadequately justified;8 ' and finally,
(f) that feasibility analysis creates a path dependency
problem. This critique posits that, under feasibility analysis,
risks considered earlier in time arbitrarily will tend to be
regulated more heavily, as there are more industry profits
available to put toward compliance without running afoul of
economic feasibility, while risks considered later in time will
tend to be underregulated, as industry's profits have already
been depleted by earlier regulations, leaving less resources
available for compliance costs without violating economic
feasibility.86
Masur and Posner recognize that CBA is not perfect, either. The
quantification of some inputs in the CBA calculation (most obviously
health benefits) is a troubling issue, although attempts have been made to
estimate the value of statistical lives using available data.87 Some benefits
often get left out of the equation altogether, as do many nonfatal, non-
cancer illnesses.8 ' There are also arbitrary but critical decisions to be made
in CBA, such as identifying the proper discount rate for costs that are not
incurred, or benefits that are not accrued, until some point in the future.89
In sum, Masur and Posner acknowledge that, like feasibility, "CBA also
uses vague terms, and requires some choices that are relatively arbitrary.""
" See id. at 706 ("As the [OSHA hexavalent] chromium and [EPA] paper mill regulations
illustrate, the agencies' use of the test seems to be ad hoc. The explanations are unpersuasive, the
presumptions or rules they use arbitrary, and the recourse to exceptions frequent and inadequately
justified.").
' See id at 698 ("Finally, feasibility analysis is path dependent and can result in underregulation
if more hazardous activities are discovered after regulations addressing less hazardous activities are
issued."). Masur and Posner note that agencies might avoid this path dependency problem by refraining
from issuing regulations that will require an overly large portion of industry profits for compliance. But
they contend that any such self-imposed restraint by the regulators only reveals the potential for
underregulation-areas where tighter regulations might be cost-benefit justified, but where the agency
does not want to exceed some arbitrary percentage ofprofits in compliance costs. Id. at 696-97.
' See id. at 701 (summarizing these quantification issues, and noting that CBA "analysts have
struggled with these problems and proposed a range of imaginative methods for estimating and
monetizing harms"). Masur and Posner cite the well-known work of W. Kip Viscusi and others who
have, among other techniques, used evidence of compensatory wage differentials-risk premiums-to
estimate the value that individuals place on their own lives. Id at 701 n.206 (citing, inter alia, W. Kip
Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates
Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (2003)). For more such studies, see also Driesen,
Two Cheers, supra note 6, at 317 (noting the "controversial assumptions" inherent in monetizing health
or environmental risks).
' For instance, in estimating the benefits of the Hexavalent Chromium Standard, only illnesses
caused by cancer or dermatitis were considered. Masur & Posner, supra note 7, at 671.
89 See id at 674 (noting that in the Hexavalent Chromium Standard calculations, the choice
between a seven percent and three percent discount rate affected the estimated benefits of various levels
of regulation by a factor of almost two).
9 Id at 705.
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Yet, they maintain that CBA is superior to feasibility because only CBA
has a coherent normative basis. They write:
But if the analyst keeps the overall goal of CBA in mind-
the promotion of public well-being-then the ambiguities
[inherent in CBA] can be resolved. Feasibility analysis's
notion of balancing employment with health and safety
provides no similar guidance because it offers no theoretical
way to determine the correct balance.91
In this passage Masur and Posner make it quite clear that the normative
guiding principle for CBA should be the maximization of overall total
welfare. They do not consider that the maximization of only worker
welfare might be an alternative normative basis that could provide just as
much guidance to an analyst.
In responding to Masur and Posner's critique, Professor Driesen
acknowledged some of the shortcomings of feasibility. 92 Indeed, the title of
his response paper, Two Cheers for Feasible Regulation, reflects an
understanding that feasibility is not "a perfect ideal for regulation, but
[rather] a rational norm among several plausible ones."93 Nonetheless,
Driesen argues that Masur and Posner's accusations of under- and over-
regulation were measured against the yardstick of monetized costs and
benefits-thus "assum[ing] what they try to prove." 94 Driesen argues that
Masur and Posner never examine or justify their answer to the key
question: "Is the equation of aggregate costs and benefits at the margin the
proper ideal for regulation?" 95
B. CBA Lite
Recognizing many of the traditionally identified weaknesses with
formal CBA, including the quantification of health benefits or deaths
avoided, some have proposed a qualified version of CBA that asks whether
the benefits of a regulation justify its costs. The leading proponent of this
view is former Administrator of OIRA Cass Sunstein. As an academic,
Sunstein developed his version of CBA in a series of books and articles.9
Some have referred to Sunstein's approach as CBA Lite or Soft CBA.97
The critical difference between Sunstein's CBA Lite and full-flavored
9' Id. at 705-06.
' Driesen, Two Cheers, supra note 6, at 315 ("I agree with Masur and Posner's characterization
of that practice as less than wholly satisfactory.").
9 Id.
9 Id
95 Id
' See sources cited supra note 10.
9 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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CBA is that CBA Lite recognizes that some qualitative benefits cannot be
easily quantified, yet may provide justification for a regulation that might
otherwise fail a CBA test that turned solely on quantified marginal costs
and marginal benefits. As Professor Sunstein describes this view, analysts
employing CBA should have before them a "full accounting" of the
consequences of regulation, "in both qualitative and quantitative terms."
The regulatory officials should then make decisions without being tightly
bound by the numbers, but they should "be prepared to explain how the
benefits justify the costs, or if not, why it is nonetheless worthwhile to go
forward." 99
CBA Lite suffers from some of the same drawbacks as formal CBA. It
relies, to a large extent, on a quantification and monetization of the health
benefits of regulation.'" That exercise is fraught with uncertainty, both
practical and theoretical. Yet, a CBA Lite approach may also suffer from
the sort of uncertainty that Masur and Posner abhor. What kinds of
qualitative factors should be deemed sufficient to "justify" the imposition
of regulations that are not mathematically justified by a comparison of
quantified marginal benefits to quantified marginal costs? If feasibility
analysis lacks a guiding principle for regulators, then it would appear that
CBA Lite is similarly lacking.10'
IV. THE ANTI-HEALTH THEFT PRINCIPLE
Proponents of CBA and CBA Lite have a point. Feasibility analysis, at
least as it is currently understood and applied by OSHA, is unprincipled.
Differing thresholds for compliance costs as a percentage of profits and
revenue show that OSHA is not operating with a clear decision rule.
Likewise, ad hoc exceptions for certain industries or applications that
OSHA rationalizes with conclusory statements about market niches and
price elasticity make it difficult to comprehend exactly what OSHA means
by "economic feasibility." Why are elasticity of demand and potential
price increases mentioned only for certain industries in certain regulatory
impact analyses, when compliance costs as a percentage of revenue or
profits appear to be OSHA's preferred measures of economic feasibility?
9 SUNSTEN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 10, at 106-07.
9Id. at 107.
"n McGarity, supra note 9, at 2344-45 ("When addressed to credible risks to human health,
however, this monetization function encounters not only large measurement uncertainties, but also
serious theoretical impediments, including the daunting question of whether the proper measure is
'willingness-to-pay' or 'willingness-to-sell."'). Professor McGarity contends that Sunstein recognizes
the great degree of uncertainty inherent in quantifying health benefits, yet adheres to his favored form
of soft CBA because of his apparent contempt for the way ordinary individuals make decisions about
risk. Id. at 2365, 2376.
"01 See Graham, supra note 9, at 437, 447-48 (describing "intuitive balancing," an essentially
unprincipled form of weighing test which is part of CBA Lite).
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What, exactly, is the guiding theory that feasibility analysis can offer for
selecting a PEL that reaches the correct balance, avoiding both under-
regulation and over-regulation? Identifying a stopping point is important,
regardless of whether the yardstick is aggregate costs and benefits at the
margins or something else. CBA proponents believe feasibility offers no
such alternative theory, leaving CBA (or perhaps CBA Lite) as the only
principled alternative for occupational health regulation.
Yet, accepting that OSHA's current economic feasibility standard is
unprincipled does not require that one accept CBA proponents' normative
theory of the correct balance. Masur and Posner argue that, unlike
feasibility analysis, CBA offers an overall goal-"the promotion of public
well-being"-to guide regulators. 10 2 By "public well-being," Masur and
Posner are decidedly referring to the maximization of overall social
welfare. 10 3 But acknowledgement of the problems with OSHA's current
understanding of feasibility analysis does not necessarily require
acceptance of the proposition that maximization of overall public well-
being is or should be the goal of the OSH Act. There is an another possible
goal for occupational health regulation; one that has been accepted in other
regulatory contexts, but that was not considered by Professors Driesen,
Masur and Posner, or Sunstein. That goal is the maximization of worker
welfare.
A. Worker Welfare, Not Overall Social Welfare
Many economists, including Masur and Posner, generally take as an
appropriate policy goal the maximization of overall social welfare.'0 The
maximization of overall social welfare in any given market involves the
maximization of the sum of two separate components of social welfare-
consumer surplus and producer surplus.' The sum of these two
components is sometimes referred to as "total welfare" or "total
surplus."'0 6 In the classic graphical depiction of partial market equilibrium
for a given good in a competitive market, consumer surplus and producer
surplus are represented in Figure 1.
'02 Masur & Posner, supra note 7, at 698.
03 Id
104 Id.
'5 See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 145 (6th ed. 2012) ("[Tlhe economic
well-being of a society ... [can be] measure[d] [as] the sum of consumer and producer surplus, which
we call total surplus.").
'" See id; Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, and
the Challenge of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REv. 849, 858 n.21 (2000).
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In the labor market, workers are the producers of the market good
(labor) and employers purchase their labor for a price (wages, benefits, and
other terms of employment). Figure 2 depicts a partial equilibrium model
of the labor market. In Figure 2, producer surplus can now be labeled
"worker surplus," while consumer surplus can now be labeled "employer
surplus." In the assumptions behind this hypothetical labor market model,
the labor supply curve intersects with the price axis at point M,
representing the lowest price that any worker in this market would be
willing to accept for his or her labor (here, 1).
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Worker surplus is depicted by the area bounded by P-E-M in Figure 2,
and represents the total amount of welfare that workers, as a group, receive
by trading their labor for the market-rate package of wages and benefits
(here, P = 5), when they would have been willing to work for less.
Conversely, "employer surplus" represents the total amount of welfare that
employers obtain by purchasing workers' labor at that same market rate,
when they would have been willing to pay more for the same labor.
Employer surplus most immediately benefits the employing firm in the
form of increased profits. Employer surplus will, in some measure, also
redound to the benefit of the shareholders of the employing firm in the
form of increased share value or increased dividend payments. Some
portion of any increase in employer surplus may also be reflected in
benefits to consumers in the market for the goods produced by the
employing firm, either in the form of decreased prices for that good or
increased output quantity of that good.
Maximizing total welfare often makes sense as a regulatory policy
goal, especially where there is reason to believe that markets are
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functioning reasonably well. But some markets do not operate efficiently,
often due to the failure of one or more of a set of assumptions underlying
microeconomic theory's predictions about markets in perfect competition
(e.g., imperfect information) or due to a positive or negative market
externality (a cost imposed or a benefit conferred upon parties outside the
relevant market).107  From an economic viewpoint, some type of
governmental regulation is most justified where there are such recognized
market failures.'
In the context of occupational health standards, there is a virtual
consensus among observers that market failure is at work. Indeed, even
academics with an antiregulatory bent who tend to favor market-based
solutions, such as Professors W. Kip Viscusi and Thomas Lambert, have
recognized that information failures and externalities prevent an
unregulated labor market from arriving at an efficient level of health
precautions.' 09 Although those scholars would likely advocate some form
of CBA for mandatory OSHA health standards, or some alternative means
of correcting the market failure, 10 they appear to at least acknowledge that
an unregulated free labor market does a poor job of arriving at efficient
" See Hammer, supra note 106, at 860 ("Markets are imperfect and often fail. In the presence of
market failures, arrangements that might otherwise be considered undesirable, like the presence of a
monopoly, may in fact be welfare-enhancing."); see also STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS
REFORM 23, 26-28 (1982) (describing the classic justifications for regulating in response to
externalities (or spillovers) and in response to inadequate information).
"n See BREYER, supra note 107, at 35 (noting that the major economic rationales for regulation
"underlie most major regulatory programs"); Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure:
Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 547, 553-55 (1979) (listing
spillovers/extemalities and inadequate information as two types of market failure often used to justify
regulatory intervention in markets). But see Thomas 0. McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the
Future of the Regulatory State, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1463, 1466-67 (1996) (arguing that correction of
market failures is seldom the motivation for congressional regulatory action).
" See W. Kip Viscusi, Structuring an Effective Occupational Disease Policy: Victim
Compensation and Risk Regulation, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 53, 57-58 (1984) ("Informational inadequacies
and externalities associated with occupational disease make the free market particularly ineffective in
reducing occupational disease risks and compensating disease victims." (footnotes omitted)); Thomas
A. Lambert, Avoiding Regulatory Mismatch in the Workplace: An Informational Approach to
Workplace Safety Regulation, 82 NEB. L. REV. 1006, 1009 (2004) (acknowledging a market failure
regarding exposures to hazardous substance and attributing it primarily to imperfect risk information);
see also Jason R. Bent, An Incentive-Based Approach to Regulating Workplace Chemicals, 73 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1389, 1407-12 (2012) (describing how information failures and negative externalities preclude
efficient compensation of employees); Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical
Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1796 (1989) (identifying
market factors that contribute to the underproduction of toxicity information); Elinor P. Schroeder &
Sidney A. Shapiro, Responses to Occupational Disease: The Role of Markets, Regulation, and
Information, 72 GEO. L.J. 1231, 1264 (1984) (stating that lack of information is a key factor in the
inability to protect workers from occupational disease).
"o See Lambert, supra note 109, at 1070-71 (advocating opt-out OSHA standards, combined with
an information-forcing provision that would require employers wishing to opt out to provide risk
information to employees).
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levels of risk and precaution regarding occupational exposures to
hazardous substances.
This market failure is central to the thesis of this Article, because it
results in health theft by employers. As Professor Lambert points out, one
major source of market failure is imperfect information."' Workers
typically have poor information about the health hazards of exposure to
hazardous substances in the workplace, and are also quite poor at assessing
those risks." 2 OSHA's Hazard Communication Standardll3 is an attempt to
combat that recognized problem, but the information problem persists.
Many employees remain unaware of the precise substances to which they
are exposed at work, the levels at which they are exposed, and the health
risks presented to them at those levels. Prospective employees have even
less information than current employees. Even where the employee knows
of exposure to a particular substance, the health risks are often
scientifically unknown and are therefore not disclosed in the Material
Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) required by OSHA's Hazard Communication
Standard.' 14 And even where health risks are known and disclosed,
employees are only human, and generally do a poor job of evaluating and
rationally weighing those risks in their decision-making process. Thus,
employees do not demand the wages and benefits that they would
otherwise demand to compensate for the health risks."'5 In other words,
employers can expose workers to health risks for which the employers
ultimately do not have to pay compensation in the form of higher wages,
better benefits, or other improved terms or conditions of employment; nor
are employers likely to pay for these health costs through workers'
compensation claims or employee turnover, given the information
failure." 6 Employers benefit from a wealth transfer from employees, as a
" See id. at 1009 ("[T]he primary market failure with respect to hazardous substances in the
workplace is inadequate information." (footnote omitted)).
112 See Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion ofEfficiency in Workers' Compensation "Reform," 50
RUTGERS L. REv. 657, 773-74 (1998) ("For example, workers may not be able to choose higher
compensation, or to quit a job with high risks of cancer or other diseases because of the length of time
it takes to discover disease risks, the difficulty of recognizing the source and symptoms of occupational
diseases, the expertise needed to evaluate the risks, and the difficulty of obtaining proprietary and
technical data from employers and manufacturers about these risks.").
13 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(c) (2013).
"' Bent, supra note 109, at 1423-24.
"1 Frances L. Edwards, Worker Right-to-Know Laws: Ineffectiveness of Current Policy-Making
anda Proposed Legislative Solution, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 19-27 (1987).
"' Professor Charlotte Alexander advances a framework for analyzing the effectiveness of
mechanisms for "transmitting" the externalized health costs of an employer's activities from the injured
employee back onto the employer. See Charlotte S. Alexander, Transmitting the Costs of Unsafe Work
5 (Mar. 5, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Alexander's framework looks at the
efficacy of compensating wage demands, employee quits, complaints to government regulators, union
activity, and workers' compensation claims as possible mechanisms for cost transmission back to
employers. The unique characteristics of occupational disease described above leave employees in a
particularly poor position to transmit the health costs imposed by occupational exposures back to
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group, due to the market failure.
The effects of workers' inadequate access to information about
exposures to health risks in the workplace are depicted in Figure 3.
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The information failure causes a distortion in the supply curve of the
labor market, from S to S*.'7 Workers supply their labor at a market wage
employers by way of wage demands, quits, or workers' compensation claims. The routes for
transmission of costs back to employers are further limited due to the OSH Act's lack of a private right
of action. See Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 1991) ("[Elvery court faced with the
issue has held that OSHA creates no private right of action."); Charlotte S. Alexander & Arthi Prasad,
Bottom-Up Workplace Law Enforcement: An Empirical Analysis, 89 IND. L.J. 1069, 1070 n.1 (2014)
(explaining that "bottom up" enforcement by private claims is unavailable under the OSH Act). Under
Alexander's framework, these restrictions on effective transmission mean that, in the absence of strong
union activity or vigilant top-down regulatory enforcement, employers are likely to retain the benefits
of health theft in the context of occupational exposures.
" See Christine Jolls, Employment Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND EcoNOMICS 1355 (A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (explaining that this effect on the supply curve will be
observed if employees are not aware of the information problem or if they do not change their behavior
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rate (P* = 4) that is less than they otherwise would (P = 5) if they had
perfect information about health risks and if they were to demand "correct"
compensating wage differentials adequate to offset those risks. While the
socially optimal equilibrium lies at point E, the actual market equilibrium,
given the workers' actions under the information failure, lies at point E*.
The result is a lower market wage and a higher quantity of labor provided
than would be observed in a perfectly competitive market where workers
had full information, as shown in Figure 3.
But there is also an important distributive effect. The size of employer
surplus increases (relative to the full information equilibrium) by the
addition of the trapezoidal area P-E-Z-P*. The information failure permits
an employer to obtain its labor input more cheaply, and these savings will
result in either increased profits to the employer (and therefore higher
returns to shareholders), or savings passed along to the ultimate consumers
of the employer's product in lower prices and/or higher output. But much
of this increased employer surplus comes at the expense of lost worker
welfare. The trapezoidal area given by P-E-Z-P* is transferred directly
from worker surplus to employer surplus. This area represents health
theft-an uncompensated transfer from worker welfare to employer
welfare that is made possible by the information failure.
As a result of health theft, employers have an opportunity to earn more
profit than they otherwise would if they had to fully internalize the health
risks they impose on workers. Likewise, shareholders may earn more
return on their investment in the employer's business than they otherwise
would. And, to the extent these savings are passed through to consumers of
the goods or services sold by the employer, consumers obtain a benefit in
lower product prices than they would face if the employer had to fully
internalize the health risks imposed in the product's production. In short,
health theft from employees may result in increases in industry profits,
increases in shareholder returns on investment, increases in output
quantities of the relevant goods and services, and/or decreases in consumer
prices, as compared to the efficient equilibrium market levels. Precisely
how much consumers and shareholders will share in the fruits of health
theft will depend on the price elasticities associated with the goods or
services sold by the employer. But ultimately, the result of the market
in recognition of their informational limitations). Professor Jolls summarizes the information failure's
effect on the supply curve as follows:
If employees are unaware of some aspect of the employment relationship that would
affect their willingness to supply labor, then observed labor supply will differ from
employees' "true" willingness to supply labor. In the case of workplace safety, for
instance, employees may lack adequate information about risks and harms and, as a
result, may oversupply labor at a given wage rate.
Id
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failure is, at least in part, a transfer of some portion of what would
otherwise be worker surplus in a perfectly competitive market to employer
surplus, which benefits employers, their shareholders, and the consumers
of their products.
Recognizing the nature of this transfer from worker surplus to
employer surplus in the context of occupational health, a regulator might
reasonably respond with legislation that has as its goal the maximization of
worker welfare, and not the maximization of total social welfare. A
standard that has as its goal the maximization of total social welfare, as
Masur and Posner advocate, would by definition accept a degree of health
theft from worker welfare to the benefit of employer welfare, so long as the
losses to worker welfare are exceeded by the gains to employer welfare." 8
A standard that maximizes worker welfare, by contrast, would not accept
losses to worker welfare, even if they were more than offset by gains in
employer welfare.
A standard that focused exclusively on maximizing worker welfare
would be unconcerned with the negative effects that additional regulation
might have, on employer welfare, as reflected in decreased industry
revenue, decreased industry profits, or increased prices. Effects on industry
would only be relevant to the extent that they caused unemployment, wage
decreases, or other negative effects for workers. Instead, a worker welfare
standard would be concerned only with maximizing those things that are
included in worker surplus-wages, benefits, job security, and terms and
conditions of employment, which would necessarily include the health
benefits to workers protected by the regulation.
One point frequently raised by CBA proponents merits further
discussion: workers are always also consumers and are sometimes also
shareholders (whether of their own employer or another firm)." 9 Thus,
individual workers will always derivatively suffer some negative effect
from a shrinking employer surplus. The most obvious example of this is
that a worker will face higher prices for consumer goods if occupational
health regulation is more stringent than if regulation is less stringent. A
pure worker welfare standard, however, would ignore these derivative
effects on workers as consumers or workers as shareholders. To the extent
that workers gain any derivative benefit, whether as consumers or
shareholders, from employer surplus, they also would and have gained an
excessive derivative benefit from health theft's transfer from worker
surplus to employer surplus in the absence of regulation. In other words,
"' See Nicola de Luca, Unequal Treatment and Shareholders' Welfare Growth: "Fairness" v.
"Precise Equality", 34 DEL. J. Cop. L. 853, 906 n.9 (2009) ("Under Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, an
outcome is considered more efficient if a Pareto optimal outcome can be reached by arranging some
compensation from those that are made better off to those that are made worse off.").
Il Masur & Posner, supra note 7, at 703-04.
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the prices for consumer goods that the worker/consumer faces in the
absence of regulation are only as low as they are because of health theft. In
a perfectly competitive market with perfect information, the price for that
consumer good would be higher; so a regulator opting for a worker welfare
standard might rationally choose to ignore the effect of increased consumer
prices on workers who are also consumers.
This type of worker welfare standard, while certainly failing Masur
and Posner's regulatory goal of maximizing total social welfare, might
nonetheless be justified on distributional grounds. Congress may have
decided that, to counter what it perceived as uncompensated health theft
transfers from worker surplus to employer surplus occurring in the
unregulated labor market, occupational safety standards should have as
their guiding principle the maximization of worker welfare, without regard
to the effect of compliance costs on employer surplus.
B. A Regulatory Analogy: Antitrust's Consumer Welfare Standard
A worker welfare standard is not as fanciful as it may sound. In fact, a
similar standard is perhaps the leading understanding of the regulatory goal
of U.S. antitrust law. A deep and long-running debate in antitrust law
scholarship is whether the goal of antitrust law should be the maximization
of total welfare or, instead, the maximization of consumer welfare. 2 0 As
Professor Peter Hammer notes, either might be a rational goal for antitrust
policy and the regulation of mergers.' 21
The debate is sometimes framed with a relatively simple merger
example. Assume that a proposed merger would result in efficiency gains
" See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Economics and Politics: Perspectives on the Goals and Future of
Antitrust, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175, 2176 (2013) ("The debate first took its modern form three
decades ago as a dispute between Chicagoan Robert Bork and critic Robert Lande over antitrust's
origins.. .. Chicagoan Robert Bork read the legislative history to defend an aggregate surplus goal,
while critic Robert Lande read it to defend a consumer surplus goal."); Hammer, supra note 106, at
858-59 n.23 (describing the difference between the consumer welfare model and the total welfare
model); Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 93-96 (1982) (arguing in favor of a
consumer surplus standard by contending that antitrust law was intended to prevent wealth transfers
resulting from monopoly); Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare
Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REv. 336, 336
(2010) ("There has been long-standing antitrust controversy regarding the economic welfare standard
for antitrust. Some commentators favor the aggregate economic welfare standard[] (sometimes called
the 'efficiency' or 'total surplus' standard); other commentators favor what I will refer to as the true
consumer welfare standard (sometimes called the 'pure consumer welfare' or 'consumer surplus'
standard)." (footnote omitted)); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE
LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 86 & n.19 (4th ed. 2011) (describing the debate between
proponents of total welfare and proponents of consumer welfare in the antitrust literature and noting
that, in the courts, antitrust policy follows a consumer welfare standard).
121 See Hammer, supra note 106, at 858-59 ("Conceptually, a rational antitrust policy could be
designed to maximize either total welfare or consumer surplus." (footnote omitted)).
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by reducing the costs of producing a particular product, thereby increasing
producer surplus (the producer's profits). But assume further that the
reduced level of competition post merger leaves the rational producer in a
position to raise prices above the pre-merger level, even after taking into
account the cost savings from the efficiency gains. If the post-merger result
is higher prices to consumers, and a resulting loss in consumer surplus, but
the size of that lost consumer surplus is less than the resulting gain in
producer surplus from increased profits, should antitrust policy condemn
the merger? 1 22 A total welfare standard would not condemn the merger,
because total social welfare is increased. The gains to producer surplus
(producer profits) outweigh the losses to consumer surplus (increased
prices), and the total welfare standard disregards the wealth redistribution
from consumer welfare to producer welfare. A consumer welfare standard
would condemn the merger, because it decreases consumer welfare; the
consumer welfare standard disregards the magnitude of the increased
producer profits.
This debate in the antitrust academic literature began in the 1960s and
remains ongoing and unresolved. 12 3 Robert Bork was the leading proponent
of the total welfare view, 124 while Robert Lande led the consumer welfare
challenge, arguing that Congress intended the antitrust laws to prevent
mergers that would result in wealth transfers from consumers to producers,
regardless of the merger's effect on total social welfare. 125 In the courts,
however, the academic debate is rarely mentioned.1 26 Instead, courts
"n This basic example is presented in Salop, supra note 120, at 337, and also in HOVENKAMP,
supra note 120, at 86.
" See Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2253, 2269 (2013)
("[fUntil the introduction of the consumer welfare standard in the mid-1960s, the notion that
competition was the goal of U.S. competition laws appeared to be uncontroversial." (footnote
omitted)); John B. Kirkwood, The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers
from Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2425 (2013) ("The goals of antitrust law
continue to be debated because there is no single goal that is unambiguously correct."). Professor
Kirkwood's article was part of a symposium held by the Fordham Law Review in 2013 titled, "The
Goals of Antitrust," which in itself demonstrates that the debate between total surplus and consumer
surplus in the antitrust literature continues with fervor.
124 Most influential was his book, ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT
WAR WITH ITSELF (1978), making the case for a total welfare standard. Id at 107-15. It should be
noted that Judge Bork used terminology that is widely considered confusing (or perhaps even
intentionally misleading) when he used the label "consumer welfare" to refer to what economists would
call "total welfare." See, e.g., Hammer, supra note 106, at 858 n.21 (recognizing Bork's confusing
terminology); Salop, supra note 120, at 336 ("I am using the 'true' qualifier because of the confusion
that has resulted from Judge Robert Bork's usage of the term 'consumer welfare' in referring to
aggregate welfare.").
i" See Lande, supra note 120, at 93-96 ("The [Congressional] debates strongly suggest that
higher prices to consumers were condemned because they unfairly extracted wealth from consumers
and turned it into monopoly profit.").
'2 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 120, at 86 ("While the issue shows up frequently in the antitrust
literature, it rarely appears in the case law, although it could.").
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considering antitrust cases appear to follow, with few exceptions, the
consumer welfare standard.1 27 In reviewing the antitrust cases for insight
into how courts view the goals of antitrust law, Professor James Kirkwood
recently reached the following conclusion:
In the last two decades, in short, a majority of decisions, at
all levels of the federal courts, have described the
overarching goal of the antitrust laws as the protection of
consumers rather than the maximization of social welfare.
Most decisions, of course, did not address the issue, but those
that did typically characterized the ultimate purpose as
protecting consumers, not enhancing efficiency.... No court
has allowed a practice or transaction that was shown likely to
harm consumers or small suppliers on the ground that it
would improve economic efficiency.12 8
Regardless of which view one holds about the goals of antitrust, both
positions are at least defensible as rational approaches to antitrust
regulation.' 2 9 A rational and principled policy for anticompetitive mergers
could have as its regulatory goal the avoidance of wealth transfers from
consumer surplus to producer surplus, regardless of effects on overall total
surplus. And this view of antitrust appears to be the prevailing one in the
courts.13 0
Recognizing that maximization of consumer surplus can be a
legitimate and rational guiding principle in the context of antitrust law
reveals that the debate between feasibility and CBA in the context of
occupational health regulation has been too circumscribed. CBA
advocates' assertion that only CBA offers a guiding principle for regulators
(maximization of total social welfare) is incorrect. As in antitrust law, there
" See id. ("That is to say, antitrust policy adopts the 'consumer welfare' rather than the more
general 'economic welfare' prescription."); Kirkwood, supra note 123, at 2430 ("More importantly,
when [courts] address a conflict between these two goals, they always choose consumers. No court has
allowed behavior found likely to harm consumers in the relevant market on the ground that it would
enhance economic efficiency."); John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of
Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 191, 196 (2008)
("The Chicago School's efficiency view is not only incorrect on the merits; it has not triumphed in the
courts."). But see RIcHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, at ix (2d ed. 2001) (asserting a broad
agreement that "the only goal of the antitrust laws should be to promote economic welfare"); Michael
S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations ofAntitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 239-
40 (1995) (claiming that Robert Bork and the Chicago School had "won the battle for the soul of
antitrust").
128 Kirkwood, supra note 123, at 2443-44 (footnote omitted); see also Herbert Hovenkamp,
Implementing Antitrust's Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2471, 2477 (2013) (reaching a similar
conclusion that antitrust policy has prioritized consumer welfare over total welfare where the two are in
conflict).
129 Hammer, supra note 106, at 858-59.
`0 HOVENKAMP, supra note 120, at 86; Kirkwood, supra note 123, at 2430.
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is another possible guiding principle-the maximization of worker welfare,
even at the expense of overall total welfare. Was maximization of worker
welfare the goal that Congress intended when it enacted the OSH Act?
The next Part explores that question.
V. HEALTH THEFT AND THE GOALS OF OSHA
This Part makes the positive claim that the maximization of worker
welfare (as opposed to overall social welfare) was Congress's principal
goal in enacting the OSH Act. It begins by briefly reviewing the text
chosen by Congress, and then proceeds to examine the key evidence from
the legislative history.
A. The OSHAct's Text
As detailed in Part 11, the text of the OSH Act itself gives little
indication of how costs and benefits should be weighed. In Cotton Dust,
the Court relied on several dictionary definitions of the word "feasible" in
Section 6(b)(5), including this one: "capable of being done, executed, or
effected.""' The Court then reasoned that Section 6(b)(5) requires setting
the standard that "'most adequately assures . . . that no employee will
suffer material impairment of health,' limited only by the extent to which
this is 'capable of being done."'l 3 2 But "capable of being done" obviously
carries an implied limitation, a fact that Justice Rehnquist no doubt
recognized. Capable of being done . . . without causing what, exactly?
Regulating all toxins to zero exposure levels or to zero risk levels is
capable of being done, at least in the sense that OSHA could promulgate
such highly demanding standards, to say nothing of the effects such
extreme standards would have on industry. The Court itself implicitly
approved one form of an implied limitation-an economic feasibility test
that permits the Secretary to promulgate a more lenient standard if
necessary to avoid widespread plant shutdowns or to avoid threatening the
competitive balance of the industry.13 3 Do widespread plant shutdowns in a
particular industry make a standard "incapable of being done?" As Masur
and Posner rightly point out, a given health standard might well be justified
due to overwhelming health benefits, even if it results in widespread plant
shutdowns in a particular industry. 34
A dictionary definition of the word "feasibility" offers little insight
into Congress's goals for the OSH Act. There are, however, other textual
131 Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan (Cotton Dust), 452 U.S. 490, 508-09 (1981).
132 Id. at 509 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 655(bX5) (2012)).
133 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
134 See Masur & Posner, supra note 7, at 704 ("Underregulation occurs because feasibility
analysis tolerated dangerous industrial practices if regulation would shut down plants.").
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clues. Congress had expressly required a cost-benefit analysis in other
statutes, including the Flood Control Act of 1936'3 and the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978.136 As the Cotton Dust
majority notes, Congress elected not to use similar language in Section
6(b)(5) of the OSH Act.'3 1 This suggests that Congress may have accepted
occupational health regulation that would benefit workers, even at the
potential expense of some loss in overall total social welfare. Yet, as
Justice Rehnquist pointed out in the Benzene case, the same textual
argument may run just as well against OSHA's current feasibility
approach. Congress has specifically limited regulatory analysis to
technological and economic feasibility in some environmental statutes, but
did not clearly do so in Section 6(b)(5) of the OSH Act.138
Using the OSH Act's relatively vague text alone, or when comparing it
to the text Congress selected for other similar statutes, honest observers
would likely admit that either reading is a plausible one. As with the
antitrust laws, Congress members likely did not consider the question in
the formal economic terms represented by the maximization of total
welfare versus the maximization of only worker welfare. A worker welfare
interpretation is at least consistent with the statutory text.
One additional textual clue lies in the comparison of Section 6(b)(5)
health standards to other occupational safety standards. Section 6(b)(5)
applies only to those standards "dealing with toxic materials or harmful
physical agents," 39 and suggests stricter regulation for such standards than
for those governed only by the definition of "occupational safety and
health standard" found in Section 3(8).140 This suggests that Congress
recognized an important difference between exposures to toxic materials
3 33 U.S.C. § 701a (allowing the federal government to "improve or participate in the
improvement of navigable waters .. . if the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of
the estimated costs, and if the lives and social security of people are otherwise adversely affected").
This provision was cited in Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. at 5 10.
` 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b) (authorizing "the use of the best available and safest technologies which
[are] . .. economicallyfeasible, . . . except where the Secretary determines that the incremental benefits
are clearly insufficient to justify the incremental costs of utilizing such technologies." (emphasis
added)). This provision was also cited in Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. at 510.
13 Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. at 510-11 ("These and other statutes demonstrate that Congress uses
specific language when intending that an agency engage in cost-benefit analysis.").
" See Indus. Union Dept. v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607, 682 n.5 (1980) (citing
Section 211 (cX2XA}-(B) of the CAA, and observing, "When Congress has wanted to limit the concept
of feasibility in this fashion, it has said so, as is evidenced in a statute enacted the same week as the
provision at issue here.").
' Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 6(b)(5), 84 Stat. 1590,
1594 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 655(bX5) (2012))
" See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 3(8) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §
652(8) (2012)) ("The term 'occupational safety and health standard' means a standard which requires
conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes,
reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of
employment.").
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and other types of physical safety hazards. Combined with evidence from
the legislative history, it appears that Congress carved out exposures to
toxic materials for different treatment because Congress recognized that
workers were being exposed to such toxic materials without awareness of
the risks, without receiving risk premiums for such exposures, and without
the likelihood of recovering in tort or workers' compensation for any
resulting illnesses. In other words, Section 6(b)(5) risks are treated
differently in the text of the statute because such risks are most likely to be
associated with health theft by employers.
B. The OSHAct's Legislative History
Evidence from the legislative history provides strong support for the
view that the congressional body that enacted the OSH Act in 1970 would
have rejected an approach that prioritized the maximization of overall total
welfare above the maximization of worker welfare. The legislative history
of the OSH Act is overwhelmingly focused on the preservation of worker
health and safety.1 4 1 Aside from countless general statements about the
importance of preserving worker health,1 42 more specific statements in the
legislative history show that Congress intended worker welfare to be the
primary regulatory concern, even at the expense of lost producer profits or
losses to end consumers in the form of higher prices for consumer
goods.1 43 Congressional statements during the debates on the OSH Act
reflected a clear understanding of the market failures that create
opportunities for health theft by employers.
Members noted the severe information deficiencies in the area of
14' The Senate Committee Report accompanying the original Senate bill (S. 2193) stated as the
original bill's purpose: "to reduce the number and severity of work-related injuries and illnesses which,
despite current efforts of employers and government, are resulting in ever-increasing human misery and
economic loss." S. REP. No. 91-1282, at 1 (1970). The "shared objective" of the original Senate bill (S.
2193) and a substitute bill (S. 4404) is described as "reduc[ing] the number and severity of work-
related injuries and illnesses which, in spite of current efforts, continue at high levels, and which cause
human misfortune and economic waste." 116 CONG. REC. 35,606 (1970). Individual references to the
importance of preserving employee health and safety in the legislative history are too numerous to list.
See, e.g., id. at 36,523 (statement of Sen. Saxbe) ("We cannot be detracted by any other interest, of
either the union or the employer, from our primary purpose of saving lives and preventing injury to
employees."); id at 37,625 (statement of Sen. Yarborough) ("We are talking about people's lives, not
the indifference of some cost accountants."); id at 37,325 (statement of Sen. Williams) ("The spread of
industry and the mobility of the work force combine to make the health and safety of the worker truly a
national concern."); id at 37,345 (statement of Sen. Harris) ("It is both appalling and tragic that as
many as 14,500 persons are killed annually as a result of industrial accidents. . . . The situation is
equally appalling in the area of occupational health."); id. at 37,628 (statement of Sen. Nelson) ("If we
are serious about our concern for providing a healthy environment for all of our citizens we must
include as a high priority protection of the working men and women of our Nation in their places of
employment.").
142 See supra note 141.
143 See sources cited supra note 141; infra text accompanying notes 146-47.
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occupational health, and the inability of scientific knowledge to keep pace
with the risks imposed on workers. For example, Senator Williams stated:
"New scientific knowledge points to hitherto unsuspected cause-and-effect
relationships between occupational exposures and many of the so-called
chronic diseases-cancer, respiratory ailments, allergies, heart disease, and
others." 1 " He also made specific reference to "frequent exposures" to a
"great variety of toxic materials or harmful physical agents" (thus tracking
the language of Section 6(b)(5)), urging: "[Workers] are often unaware of
the nature of such exposure or of its extent. In some cases, the
consequences of overexposure may [be] severe and immediate; in other
cases, effects may be delayed or latent." 45
Some members expressly considered the tradeoffs that more protective
health regulation would require against increased consumer prices or
decreased industry profits. For example, Senator Yarborough expressed his
views on price effects: "We know the costs would be put into consumer
goods but that is the price we should pay for the 80 million workers in
America."l 4 6 Likewise, Senator Eagleton considered the price that
employers would pay in the form of lost producer profits: "The costs that
will be incurred by employers in meeting the standards of health and safety
to be established under this bill are, in my view, reasonable and
necessary costs of doing business." 4 7
One reason that members of Congress seemed willing to focus on
preservation of worker health and safety, even at the expense of increased
consumer prices or decreased employer profits, was that Congress
appeared to believe the unregulated labor market was resulting in what this
Article has termed health theft. Congress was concerned that employers
were exposing employees to health risks, particularly exposures to
hazardous substances, for which the employee was not receiving any
compensation in the form of increased wages, benefits, or other improved
conditions of employment due to an information inadequacy market
failure.
No Representative or Senator used the term "health theft," of course,
1" 116 CONG. REC. 37,325 (1970) (statement of Sen. Williams). Senator Williams pointed out
that the Public Health Service "conservative[ly]" estimated that there were 390,000 new occurrences of
occupational disease each year. Id He further provided examples of "shameful" neglect of the worker's
health in specific industries: a delayed recognition of byssinosis as a "distinct occupational disease
among workers in American cotton mills;" failure to strive to prevent asbestosis, pulmonary cancer,
and mesothelioma, despite known risks of exposure to asbestos; and the lack of effective control over
the use of pesticides and fungicides in the agricultural industry, "[d]espite the unmistakable danger that
these substances present." Id.
' Id at 37,326 (statement of Sen. Williams). Senator Williams further stressed the importance of
both adequate protection "against excessive exposure to fumes, gases, dust, or other substances
determined to be harmful" and adequate access to information about such hazards. Id.
'" Id. at 37,345 (statement of Sen. Yarborough).
"' Id at 41,764 (statement of Sen. Eagleton).
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but the concept of health theft was nonetheless expressed in the
Congressional reports this way:
[T]he fact is that many employers-particularly smaller
ones-simply cannot make the necessary investment in
health and safety, and survive competitively, unless all are
compelled to do so. The competitive disadvantage of the
more conscientious employer is especially evident where
there is a long period between exposure to a hazard and
manifestation of an illness. In such instances a particular
employer has no economic incentive to invest in current
precautions, not even in the reduction of workmen's
compensation costs, because he will seldom have to pay for
the consequences of his own neglect.1 48
This statement describes the result of a market failure, and it was that
market failure that Congress sought to counteract with occupational health
regulations under Section 6(b)(5) of the OSH Act. It would be contrary to
Congress's intent to now limit the reach of occupational health standards
by placing the goal of maximizing total social welfare above the goal of
worker welfare maximization. Congress fully understood that protecting
workers from health theft would result in losses to employer surplus in the
form of decreased employer profits, decreased returns to investors, and
increased consumer prices. It deemed that outcome appropriate, even
desirous, because Congress was counteracting what it perceived as a
serious imperfection in the labor market that caused a wealth transfer from
workers to employers, and derivatively, to consumers and investors.
VI. A PRINCIPLED INTERPRETATION OF FEASIBILITY
This Part makes the normative case that a worker welfare standard is a
justifiable and workable alternative to CBA and CBA Lite, that it satisfies
most (if not all) of the consistency concerns of CBA advocates, and that
OSHA should adopt the worker welfare standard as a reasonable
interpretation of Section 6(b)(5) of the OSH Act.
A. Distributional Justification
The decades-long debate over the goals of antitrust law 49 shows that a
rational regulatory policy might have as its goal either the maximization of
total welfare or the maximization of only consumer welfare. Likewise, as
Professor Driesen points out, the maximization of overall efficiency,
measured by comparing the marginal costs of regulation to its marginal
' S. REP. No. 91-1282, at 4 (1970).
14 See supra Section IV.B.
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benefits, is just one of several possible rational regulatory schemes for
environmental or occupational health risks.150 Maximization of worker
welfare is a rational alternative goal, and unlike OSHA's current
application of feasibility analysis, a worker welfare standard would provide
a coherent guiding principle that should lead to consistency in application.
The maximization of only worker welfare can easily be justified on
distributional grounds. To illustrate, imagine two simplified, hypothetical
labor markets, Market A and Market B. In Market A, the assumption of
perfect information is met, and the market is competitive. In Market A,
1,000 workers each have quantified welfare equaling $100. This welfare
unit measure includes the workers' wages, benefits, job security, health
risk level, job satisfaction, and all other conditions of employment. Total
worker welfare in Market A equals $100,000 (1,000 workers x $100). In
Market A, employers as a group (industry) have a total welfare of
$100,000. Total overall social welfare, the sum of worker welfare and
employer welfare, therefore equals $200,000.
In Market B, workers have inadequate information about the health
risks to which they are exposed, and long latency periods and problems of
proof typically prevent workers from recovering for illnesses in workers'
compensation. The information failures and externalities lead to an
oversupply of labor at any given wage. Market B, in other words, reflects
the effects of health theft. In Market B, the same 1,000 workers now have
quantified welfare equaling $70 each, as $30 each is lost to uncompensated
health theft. Importantly, additional workers find employment in Market B,
as production costs are lower and wages are lower. Assume that an
additional 100 workers have quantified welfare of $70 each after finding
work in this labor market, for a total of 1,100 workers with $70 welfare.
The total worker welfare in Market B, given these assumptions, is $77,000.
In Market B, employer welfare is significantly expanded. First,
employer welfare increases relative to Market A by $30,000 as a result of
health theft from the original 1,000 employees. Employers do not have to
pay compensating wage differentials for risky work, and they generally
avoid paying for the costs of their negligence in the form of workers'
compensation. Employer welfare is also boosted by the ability to hire 100
additional workers at relatively lower wages, leading to increased output
and increased profits. Assume the total value of this increase to be
$20,000. In Market B, then, the total employer welfare in the labor market
" See Driesen, Feasibility, supra note 6, at 47 (describing feasibility analysis as a "reasonable
congressional judgment about how agencies should address the cost of environmental regulation");
Driesen, Two Cheers, supra note 6, at 314 ("This claim supports the feasibility principle, the idea that
administrative agencies should regulate serious health and environmental hazards as stringently as
possible without causing widespread plant shutdowns, not as a perfect ideal for regulation, but as a
rational norm among several plausible ones.").
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equals $150,000. The gains in employer welfare from health theft,
combined with the production efficiency gains, will result in substantial
benefits for investors and consumers. Shareholders will earn higher returns
and consumers will pay lower prices for the industry's products. This is
reflected in the gains to overall social welfare. The total overall social
welfare in Market B, given the assumptions above, would be $227,000, of
which $77,000 is worker welfare and $150,000 is employer welfare.
Given the choice between Market A and Market B, reasonable minds
could differ about which market to prefer. A welfare-maximizing CBA
proponent would likely argue that Market B increases the overall size of
the economic pie, total social welfare ($227,000, as opposed to $200,000),
which is better for society as a whole. Any distributive concerns might be
taken care of through direct redistributive tax or welfare policies. But even
Cass Sunstein recognizes that distribution matters when setting regulatory
policy, 15 ' and it certainly mattered to Congress, as unambiguously
demonstrated in the OSH Act's legislative history.1 5 2
A rational policymaker might just as easily reject the preference for
Market B's -larger overall total social welfare, reasoning that workers
should have something akin to a property right in their health-yes, they
can trade some portion of their health away by taking on risk in exchange
for some form of market compensation, but employers cannot obtain that
portion of the worker's health without compensation by taking advantage
of well-recognized information failures and externalities in the labor
market. The existence of uncompensated health theft in Market B might
improve overall social welfare, providing significant gains to consumers
and investors, but it comes at the cost of an uncompensated taking of that
property right in health from an identifiable group of workers.' 53 A rational
"' See SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON, supra note 10, at 125 ("The basic point is right; we do need
to know who would bear the costs and enjoy the benefits. That has been and will continue to be one of
my principal themes. Recall that I have not urged that the monetized numbers should be decisive.").
152 See supra Part V.B (discussing the focus on preservation of worker health and safety in the
OSH Act's legislative history, even if the costs would be distributed amongst producers, employers,
and consumers).
.. Indeed, the overall national economy might be far more productive-with cheaper goods,
more production, and higher investor returns generally-if there were no occupational health or safety
regulation at all. But that comes at a price that policymakers might reasonably deem to be too high.
After the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire in 1911, the idea of leaving employees' working conditions
entirely in the hands of the unregulated free market was broadly rejected by the public and eventually
led to legislative reform. See generally LEON STEIN, THE TRIANGLE FIRE 135-41, 207-08 (1962)
(discussing the protests and memorial meetings that immediately followed the Triangle Shirtwaist
Factory fire, the attitude "that a sense of outrage was meaningless unless turned into a force for
reform," and the eventual legislative reform that followed); Eric G. Behrens, Note, The Triangle
Shirtwaist Company Fire of 1911: A Lesson in Legislative Manipulation, 62 TEX. L. REv. 361, 362-63
(1983) (noting the public's "indignation" and "shock" when it learned that the Triangle Shirtwaist
Company's management had disregarded the safety of its workers, and discussing how this public
outcry eventually led to legislative reform following the fire of 1911).
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policymaker might choose Market A instead, to preserve workers' property
rights in their own health. Even if the policymaker is generally sympathetic
to deregulation, the benefits of free exchange, and market-based
approaches to regulatory policy, she might still rationally prefer Market A
in this situation, recognizing that the productivity gains in Market B are
obtained only at the expense of an unjustified intrusion upon workers'
property rights in their health.15 4
If a rational policymaker might prefer Market A over Market B, to
avoid health theft, then it follows that Congress could rationally choose to
regulate in a way that prioritizes the maximization of worker welfare over
the maximization of overall total social welfare. Congress, believing that
the U.S. labor market was characterized by significant degrees of health
theft from market failures, could justifiably set occupational health
standards designed to move from a market resembling Market B toward a
market that more closely resembles the outcome of the full-information
Market A. Placing a formal CBA limit on such regulation would by
definition thwart the legislation's justifiable purpose-the counteraction of
perceived health theft in the market. Responding to health theft in a way
that maximizes worker welfare is both justified on distributional grounds
and an accurate description of Congressional intent, in light of the
legislative history of the OSH Act.
B. A Principled Guide for Regulators
Unlike OSHA's current and inconsistent feasibility analysis, an anti-
health theft principle provides clear and principled guidance to the
regulator about the proper stopping point for regulation. Thus, 0S-tA
should give to Section 6(b)(5) an interpretation that permits regulation to
the extent that it maximizes worker welfare.
In practice, an anti-health theft principle would maximize worker
welfare by considering a proposed regulation's effect on workers' health,
wages, benefits, employment levels, job security, and other terms and
conditions of employment. The secondary interests of workers as
consumers paying higher prices for consumer goods, and of workers as
investors receiving smaller returns on investment should be ignored.
These secondary interests are derivative of gains in employer welfare in
the labor market from health theft."' While the current OSHA feasibility
approach considers a regulation's effect on profits or revenues as a sort of
proxy for widespread plant shutdowns,1 56 a worker welfare standard would
15 See RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 41 (8th ed. 2011) ("The creation of
individual (as distinct from collective) ownership rights is a necessary, rather than a sufficient,
condition for the efficient use of resources.").
.. See supra Part IVA.
" See supra Part I.C.
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focus directly on employment levels. As Masur and Posner point out,
regulatory agencies are capable of directly predicting unemployment
effects and have done so in other contexts.'57
The anti-health theft interpretation of Section 6(b)(5) would not only
provide a coherent guiding principle for regulators, it would effectively
resolve most (if not all) of the other consistency concerns raised by CBA
proponents.158 It would provide a coherent stopping point for regulation-
the point at which the marginal benefits to workers of additional regulation
equal the marginal costs to workers of such regulation.15 9 Unlike OSHA's
current feasibility test, it would not even arguably overregulate by ignoring
widespread unemployment where no plant closures are implicated.16 0 It
would not underregulate by prohibiting beneficial regulations simply
because they may close some plants; to the contrary, it would clearly
weigh the health benefits to workers against the unemployment costs to
workers.161 And it would permit regulators to avoid reliance on arbitrary
presumptions or ad hoc exceptions.' 62
Like the formal CBA advocated by Masur and Posner,1 63 an anti-health
theft approach to occupational health regulations would of course require
some degree of arbitrary valuations and assumptions. For example, how
much unemployment hardship is justified to offset the loss of one
statistical worker life? But, to paraphrase Masur and Posner's justification:
If the analyst keeps the overall goal of the anti-health theft principle in
mind-the promotion of worker well-being-then the ambiguities can be
" See Masur & Posner supra note 7 at 695 ("In any event, why use proxies if the real concern is
piant closings or job lossesr Agencies can estimate these outcomes directly-EPti did just this in the
paper mill regulation-and can evaluate regulations' feasibility on the basis of them."); Masur &
Posner, supra note 83, at 586-603 (detailing several examples of federal agencies directly estimating
job losses either on an industry-wide level or on a national economy level).
i" See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text (noting a range of critiques regarding feasibility
analysis, as posited by Masur and Posner).
" Cf supra note 81 and accompanying text (noting the argument that feasibility analysis does
not present a coherent stopping point for how far regulation should go).
i" Cf supra note 83 and accompanying text (noting the argument that by focusing on plant
closures, feasibility analysis overregulates, thus ignoring widespread increases in unemployment that
do not cause plant closures).
... Cf supra note 84 and accompanying text (noting the argument that by prohibiting a regulation
where the overall benefits may outweigh the costs, feasibility analysis underregulates by prohibiting
regulations that would substantially reduce grave risks of harm simply because they may close some
plants).
62 Cf supra note 85 and accompanying text (noting the lack of clarity provided by feasibility
analysis).
163 See Masur & Posner, supra note 7, at 712 ("Where statutes delegate agencies policymaking
authority, those agencies should exercise their power under the Chevron doctrine to replace feasibility
analysis with CBA or another suitable decision procedure.").
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resolved. 164
Two of Masur and Posner's complaints about feasibility will not be
resolved by the anti-health theft principle. First, Masur and Posner criticize
feasibility for ignoring the costs of regulations imposed on consumers.165
Admittedly, an anti-health theft principle would also ignore the costs of
occupational health regulations imposed on consumers. But, as explained
above, that is entirely consistent with the legislature's intent.166 Congress
clearly understood that protecting worker health would increase the cost of
consumer goods, and the evidence from the legislative history indicates
that Congress thought such price increases were appropriate.167 In fact, a
formal CBA that weighs the costs imposed on consumers against the health
benefits of regulation would run quite contrary to the declared purposes of
the OSH Act. The lower prices that consumers pay in the absence of
adequate health regulation is a derivative effect from the gains in employer
welfare caused by health theft. Counteracting health theft will necessarily
result in higher prices, but imposing those costs is fully justified on the
distributional grounds set forth above, as Congress recognized.
Second, the anti-health theft approach may not completely resolve the
path dependency issue that Masur and Posner identify.168 But this concern
is likely overstated. The path dependency issue appears to be more of a
hypothetical issue with feasibility analysis than a real world problem that
has affected regulation. Masur and Posner do not identify any particular
instance in which path dependency may have caused regulators to impose
less stringent regulation on a later-identified risk, simply because
compliance with an earlier-identified risk pushed the industry to the brink
of collapse. Even if path dependency is a real problem, the anti-health theft
approach will at least reduce the likelihood of its occurrence. Rather than
regulating risks to the point at which the competitive balance of an industry
is close to upset, a worker welfare standard will in many cases identify an
earlier stopping point-where the marginal benefits to workers of more
stringent regulation are equal to the marginal costs imposed on workers.
An anti-health theft standard, therefore, is less likely than OSHA's current
feasibility approach to push industry to the brink of collapse.169
'- Cf id. at 705-06 ("Feasibility analysis's notion of balancing employment with health and
safety provides no similar guidance because it offers no theoretical way to determine the correct
balance.").
" See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
'6 See 116 CONG. REc. 37,345 (1970) (statement of Sen. Yarborough) ("We know the costs
would be put into consumer goods but that is the price we should pay for the 80 million workers in
America.").
'" See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing the path dependency problem that
feasibility analysis creates).
169 Further, it is not clear that Masur and Posner's CBA approach entirely avoids path dependency
either. Masur and Posner note that path dependency could be an issue in formal CBA if unemployment
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C. A Reasonable Interpretation ofSection 6(b) (5)
Finally, it is worth briefly noting that an anti-health theft understanding
of the OSH Act's directive to OSH-A is a reasonable interpretation of
Section 6(b)(5) that would be entitled to judicial deference under the
Chevron doctrine.170 Under Chevron's first step, it seems clear that
Congress has not "directly spoken to the precise question at issue."'7 The
statutory language does not directly answer the question of the appropriate
balance between costs and benefits in health regulations dealing with
toxins, as amply illustrated in Parts II.A. and V.A. Under Chevron's
second step, the anti-health theft interpretation should be deemed a
permissible construction of the statute. 172 It is a reasonable construction of
the statute, in light of the statutory text and the legislative history of the
OSH Act, as set forth above. Moreover, any prior, contrary judicial gloss
on the ambiguous "feasibility" language of Section 6(b)(5) would not stand
in the way of OSHA adopting a worker welfare standard as a reasonable
interpretation of economic feasibility.173
costs are considered as part of the analysis. See Masur & Posner, supra note 7, at 697 n. 186 ("Path
dependency could be introduced if the CBA takes into account hardship from job loss; however, as
noted earlier, these costs are generally ignored for largely sensible reasons."). In a later paper, however,
Masur and Posner take the position that the costs imposed by unemployment hardship "are significant
and cannot be ignored as rounding errors." Masur & Posner, supra note 83, at 633. They conclude:
"Agencies should attempt to quantify these [unemployment] costs as precisely as possible, including
taking into account how easily an industry can absorb regulatory costs, which types of workers will be
laid off, and whether they will be able to find other jobs within the same industry." Id.
170 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984) ("When a court reviews an
agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First ...
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter . . .. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed
the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer
is based on a permissible construction of the statute.").
"' Id at 842.
172 Id at 843; see also Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72
Cmi.-KENT L. REv. 1253, 1261-62 (1997) (noting that when the Supreme Court reviews an agency's
interpretation, "it either upholds the agency or reverses on the strength of step one," and questioning
whether the second step "serves any useful purpose at all").
173 OSHA cites language from United Steelworkers ofAmerica v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1272
(D.C. Cir. 1980) and Industrial Union Department v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
and similar language in other cases as the basis for its current understanding of economic feasibility.
See Occupational Exposure to Respirable Crystalline Silica, 81 Fed. Reg. 16,286, 16,293 (Mar. 25,
2016). Neither Marshall, Hodgson, nor any other judicial consideration of Section 6(b)(5)'s
"feasibility" language has held the statutory language to unambiguously require the specific form of
economic feasibility inquiry that OSHA employs. As such, a reasonable contrary interpretation of
Section 6(bX5) reached by OSHA would be entitled to deference. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n
v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) ("A court's prior judicial construction of a statute
trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision
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To be sure, OSHA's move from its current feasibility analysis to an
anti-health theft approach would represent a change in the way that OSHA
interprets and implements its statutory directive in Section 6(b)(5).
However, this administrative change would be an example of needed
administrative flexibility for better enforcement of the OSH Act, and
would likely survive challenge under the leading precedents on changes to
administrative interpretations."7 4
VII. CONCLUSION
OSHA's feasibility analysis has been imperfect, unprincipled, and
inconsistent in practice, as the above survey of OSHA's major health
standards since 1981 demonstrates. But CBA proponents do not hold a
monopoly on principled decision rules. The maximization of total social
welfare is not the only legitimate goal of occupational health regulation. As
demonstrated by the prevailing view of the goals of antitrust regulation, a
rational regulatory scheme might focus exclusively on maximizing only
worker welfare in an attempt to counteract welfare transfers caused by
market imperfections. This type of distributional regulatory goal is
particularly appropriate where Congress is concerned about involuntary,
uncompensated wealth transfers from one set of players in the labor market
(workers) to the other set of players (employers), caused by information
failure and externalities in that market.
The legislative history reveals that Congress was indeed concerned
about uncompensated health theft by employers, and that Congress
intended to counteract the effects of health theft by establishing a
regulatory regime for occupational health that would have as its goal the
maximization of worker welfare. For that reason, implementing a CBA or
CBA Lite regulatory regime that has as its guiding principle the
maximization of total social welfare would be misguided and inconsistent
with Congressional intent. Instead, OSHA should modify its rudderless
understanding of feasibility analysis to expressly acknowledge that the
holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room
for agency discretion.").
1' See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502, 514 (2009) ("We find no basis in the
Administrative Procedure Act or in our opinions for a requirement that all agency change be subjected
to more searching review."); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-64 ("An initial agency interpretation is not
instantly carved in stone"). OSHA would need only explain its decision, identifying good reasons for
the change. See Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 515 ("[I]t suffices that the new policy is permissible under
the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the
conscious change of course adequately indicates."); see also Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski,
Administrative Change, 59 UCLA L. REv. 112, 129-35 (2011) (discussing the Fox Television decision
as a "[dioctrinal [bloiling [p]oint," at which the Court declined to subject administrative reversals to
heightened scrutiny); Ronald M. Levin, Hard Look Review, Policy Change, and Fox Television, 65 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 555, 573 (2011) (defending the "relatively accommodating attitude" of the Fox
Television majority toward administrative policy changes).
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guiding principle for feasibility analysis is the maximization of worker
welfare, even at the possible expense of a potential net loss in total social
welfare. This would best effectuate the key Congressional purpose of the
OSH Act: to counteract health theft.

